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JUDICIAL INTERVENTION AND
JUVENILE CORRECTIONS REFORM:
A CASE STUDY OF
JERRY M. V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Will Singer*
I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2007, Vincent N. Schiraldi was the head of the District of
Columbia’s juvenile corrections agency.1 By that time, the agency had
struggled for decades to comply with a comprehensive consent decree
aimed at remedying constitutionally deficient conditions of juvenile
confinement.2 In a meeting with the city administrator, Schiraldi was asked
to describe his top three management problems.
“My three biggest management problems right now,” Schiraldi said,
emphasizing right now as if the list might change by the end of the day,
“are keeping the staff from beating up my kids, figuring out how to cut
down on the sex-for-overtime trade between managers and the line staff,
and keeping the court off my back long enough so I can fix this damn
place.”3
*
J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Oberlin College, 2003. My
perspective on these issues is both informed and tainted by my experiences as clerk to the
D.C. Council’s committee on human services (2005–2006) and chief of budget execution in
the Office of the City Administrator (D.C.) (2007–2009).
I owe thanks to Courtney Armour, Natalie Bump, James M. Carter, Paul A. Dawson,
James Lindgren, Laura Nirider, Mike Rowe, Marc Schindler, Vinny Schiraldi, and Dan
Tangherlini. Special thanks to Molly Ptacek Singer and Leigh B. Bienen.
1
Schiraldi was then in his second year as director. See Mayor’s Order 2005-20,
Appointment, Acting Director, Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services, 52 D.C. Reg.
2840 (Mar. 18, 2005).
2
See Consent Decree, Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super.
Ct. July 24, 1986) [hereinafter Jerry M. Consent Decree]. The lawsuit remains active today.
3
Email from Vincent N. Schiraldi to author (Oct. 13, 2010) (on file with the author)
(regarding a meeting in 2007); Email from Dan Tangherlini, former City Administrator and
Deputy Mayor, to author (Jan. 28, 2011) (on file with the author) (regarding the same
meeting).
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To unpack that statement is to understand the challenges facing the
would-be reformer of a juvenile corrections agency subject to a lawsuit.
Keeping children safe is easier to say than to do.4 The difficulty exists
because public sector management demands a great deal of skill5 and
because the political system introduces considerations—such as the
imperatives of patronage politics6 and the popular appeal of promises to get
tough on new generations of “radically impulsive, brutally remorseless
youngsters”7—that sometimes take priority over maintaining safe
conditions inside a juvenile correctional facility.8 Further, any far-reaching
reform effort will challenge the entrenched institutional culture that created
these unacceptable conditions.9

4

See RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., NO PLACE FOR KIDS: THE CASE FOR
REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 5, 7 & fig. 2 (2011), available at http://www.aecf.org/
OurWork/JuvenileJustice/~/media/Pubs/Topics/Juvenile
Justice/Detention
Reform/
NoPlaceForKids/JJ_NoPlaceForKids_Full.pdf (stating that “systemic violence, abuse, and/or
excessive use of isolation or restraints have been documented” since 2000 in twenty-two
states and the District).
5
See generally, e.g., KENNETH H. ASHWORTH, CAUGHT BETWEEN THE DOG AND THE
FIREPLUG, OR HOW TO SURVIVE PUBLIC SERVICE (2001) (offering an experienced realist’s
practical advice to the newcomer).
6
See JEROME G. MILLER, LAST ONE OVER THE WALL: THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIMENT
IN CLOSING REFORM SCHOOLS 200 (2d ed., 1998) (referring to county-run training schools,
where truants were incarcerated in 1970s Massachusetts, and stating: “The true reason for
their existence—to provide patronage jobs for friends and relatives of county
commissioners—was clear from a simple scan of staff résumés. The superintendent of one
of the schools had degrees in massage and embalming. The superintendent of another came
to his position after a stint as a pie salesman. What they had in common was having worked
in the campaign of a county commissioner or otherwise endeared themselves to a local
politician or state legislator.”).
7
E.g., Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has
Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A19 (recounting the effects on public policy of John
DiIulio’s juvenile superpredator theory, which DiIulio later conceded was “wrong”).
8
See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 6, at 202 (summarizing a 1971 report on Massachusetts
county training schools where delinquent youths were treated as “truly children in bondage,
with fewer civil rights than any other group in the Commonwealth, even including inmates
in our state prisons” (internal quotations omitted)).
9
See, e.g., id. at 18–19 (stating that Massachusetts reformers successfully introduced
effective therapeutic programs into the state’s training schools, but that beatings, isolation,
and other hallmarks of institutional culture persisted; ultimately, the reformers decided to
close all the state’s training schools). Missouri’s innovative and very effective approach to
juvenile corrections is perhaps most remarkable for its rejection of the widely accepted
purposes of criminal punishment. See RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., THE
MISSOURI MODEL: REINVENTING THE PRACTICE OF REHABILITATING YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS
6–12 (2010) [hereinafter MISSOURI MODEL], available at http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/
Initiatives/Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative/MOModel/MO_Fullreport_webfinal.pdf

2012]

JUVENILE CORRECTIONS REFORM

903

At their best, juvenile corrections lawsuits require public officials to
honor their responsibilities to the troubled children placed in their
custody.10 At their worst, the lawsuits become an interfering distraction,
prioritizing technical compliance ahead of true reform. 11 Yet these suits,
and calls for major reform, exist because the conditions inside juvenile
institutions often fail to reflect the ideals that are the basis of a separate
juvenile corrections system.12
This Comment seeks to inform the participants in a lawsuit aimed at
reforming a juvenile justice system so that they may define a constructive
role for the court. To that end, this Comment examines the District of
Columbia’s juvenile corrections lawsuit over its lifespan—twenty-seven
years and counting.13
From the outset of this type of suit, the plaintiffs may be entirely
correct that conditions of confinement deprive youths of their rights. But
the court and parties must continue the inquiry to assess the real problems
that make conditions what they are. This is so because the litigation seeks
not merely to determine whether conditions fall below constitutional and
statutory standards, but more importantly to change the agency’s operations
so it will meet those standards.14 Conceivably, the judge or plaintiffs might
(comparing the effectiveness of other states’ juvenile corrections programs with that of
Missouri); id. at 36–45 (explaining Missouri’s philosophy of youth corrections).
10
See Michael J. Dale, Lawsuits and Public Policy: The Role of Litigation in Correcting
Conditions in Juvenile Detention Centers, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 675, 732–33 (1998) (“Lawsuits
reduce population, increase staffing, generate reasonable classification systems, improve
food, clean up the institution, get staff trained, cause bad staff to get fired, increase medical,
dental, and mental health care, improve the children’s education, produce alternative
programs, and perhaps most importantly, reduce the number of youngsters who get hurt.”).
11
See, e.g., JOHN J. DIIULIO, GOVERNING PRISONS 248 (1987) (stating that, in the context
of lawsuits regarding conditions in adult prisons, “prison officials have been forced to act
where court edicts contradicted both correctional judgments and operational reality”); Ross
Sandler & David Schoenbrod, From Status to Contract and Back Again: Consent Decrees in
Institutional Reform Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 115, 115–16 (2007) (criticizing the tendency
to transform consent decrees from flexible and equitable remedies into rigid contracts).
12
See, e.g., PATRICIA PURITZ & MARY ANN SCALI, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BEYOND THE WALLS: IMPROVING
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT FOR YOUTH IN CUSTODY, at xi (1998) (calling litigation a
response to well-documented deficiencies in the conditions of confinement).
13
See Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 1,
1985).
14
See Dale, supra note 10, at 733 (stating that constitutional and statutory constraints
will limit the extent of relief ordered in juvenile corrections litigation); see also Alphonse
Gerhardstein, Leveraging Maximum Reform While Enforcing Minimum Standards, 36
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 9, 16, 21 (2009) (arguing that, whenever cooperation with political and
administrative officials is possible, juvenile corrections litigation should extend its focus
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believe that operational issues present problems only for the government
defendant; this view is correct only if they do not care to implement an
effective remedy. The goal of successful implementation introduces a vast
universe of practical operational problems that merit the attention of the
court and the parties.15 Yet this Comment will argue that the court’s
interest in operational problems does not justify judicial micromanagement.
This Comment begins, in Part II, with an overview of the lawsuit and
consent decree seeking to reform the secure facilities in the District of
Columbia’s juvenile justice system. Part III reviews the theoretical
framework of “institutional reform litigation,” focusing on lawsuits
challenging conditions of juvenile and criminal confinement. Much of this
literature supposes that litigation can solve problems indirectly, by arousing
a “political will” that in turn solves the problem. Political will may be a
necessary condition, but it is far from sufficient.
Part IV shows that other considerations are important, too. A wide
variety of institutional actors react to lawsuits in ways that create barriers to
and opportunities for reform. Institutional actors of particular relevance to
this case include agency management, line staff, judges, the media, the
legislature, and the chief executive. Part IV considers each of these groups
separately. An epilogue to Part IV emphasizes the potential for political
considerations to shift in rapid and unexpected ways, testing the durability
of hard-earned progress after it has been made. In conclusion, Part V
develops the implications for how courts and parties should see their own
roles and the purposes of institutional reform litigation.
II. JUVENILE CORRECTIONS REFORM IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
In 1985, plaintiffs representing the District’s detained and committed
youths filed a class action, Jerry M. v. District of Columbia.16 The

beyond the minimal adequacy of conditions to promote the adoption of approaches that
reduce recidivism).
15
See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1979)
[hereinafter Forms of Justice] (stating that implementation of court orders to desegregate
public schools “required new procedures for the assignment of students; new criteria for the
construction of schools; reassignment of faculty; revision of the transportation systems to
accommodate new routes and new distances; reallocation of resources among schools and
among new activities; curriculum modification; increased appropriations; revision of
interscholastic sports schedules; new information systems for monitoring the performance of
the organization; and more” (citations omitted)).
16
Jerry M., C.A. No. 1519–85 (amended complaint filed Apr. 15, 1986; consent decree
entered July 24, 1986). Detained youth are those who are awaiting trial or sentencing;
committed youth are those who have been adjudicated delinquent and placed in the District’s
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plaintiffs alleged that practices inside the District’s secure juvenile
correctional facilities violated their constitutional and statutory rights.17
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged deprivations of their Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment,18 their Fifth
Amendment due process rights,19 and their statutory rights to appropriate
care20 and educational services.21 Somewhat unusually, Jerry M. was filed
and has remained in D.C. Superior Court.22
After extensive discovery and briefing, the parties agreed to a consent
decree based on three general principles: (1) youths should be housed in the
least restrictive setting consistent with public safety, their individual needs,
and constitutional and statutory requirements; (2) youths should not be held
in secure confinement when a community-based placement is suitable; and
(3) detained youths placed in secure confinement while awaiting trial
should remain there for the shortest possible time.23 Like the complaint,24

custody for up to two years. District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178, 180 n.3, 4
(D.C. 1990) (citing D.C. CODE § 16-2320 (LexisNexis 2001)).
17
Jerry M., 571 A.2d at 180; see also Ed Bruske, Suit Decries Youth Home Conditions,
WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1985, at A1 (“Youths held at the District’s facilities for juvenile
delinquents are subjected to vermin-infested housing that would not pass fire inspections, as
well as beatings from their counselors, inadequate medical attention and insufficient
educational programs, according to a lawsuit filed against the city. . . .”).
18
Amended Complaint at 53–55, Jerry M., C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 15,
1986) [hereinafter Jerry M. Complaint].
19
Id. (referencing due process rights to be free from harm, to receive rehabilitative
treatment, and to access the courts and counsel); cf. Paul Holland & Wallace J. Mlyniec,
Whatever Happened to the Right to Treatment?: The Modern Quest for a Historical
Promise, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1791, 1793–94 (1995) (stating that by the mid-1980s the
prospects for constitutional protection of juveniles’ right to treatment were “drastically
limited”).
20
Jerry M. Complaint, supra note 18, at 53 (citing D.C. CODE §§ 16-2313(b), -2320
(LexisNexis 2001)).
21
Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401–82 (2006) and D.C. CODE §§ 31-401, -403 (LexisNexis
2001)).
22
See Alison Brill, Note, Rights Without Remedy: The Myth of State Court Accessibility
After the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 645, 651–53 (2008) (explaining
why “federal courts [became] the preferred forum for challenging prison conditions” via
§ 1983 claims).
23
See Jerry M. Consent Decree, supra note 2, at 1–2 (stating the decree’s general
principles); District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178, 180–81 (D.C. 1990)
(characterizing the discovery and briefing).
24
Jerry M. Complaint, supra note 18, at 51–52 (alleging that the District inappropriately
confined youths even when public safety and rehabilitative needs did not call for secure
confinement); id. at 25–26, 36–37, 48–49 (alleging that staff were too few and too poorly
trained, creating a climate of violence in juvenile confinement facilities).
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these principles recognize the dangers of overconfinement25 and
overcrowding26 in juvenile correctional facilities.
The consent decree’s core provisions followed from its principles.
The consent decree empowered a panel of three experts to set a binding cap
on the number of youths confined to locked custody and to plan a
continuum of community-based alternatives to secure confinement.27 It
required the District to close the notorious Cedar Knoll facility28 by
December 1, 1987, and to obtain the court’s permission before constructing
additional space for secure rooms.29 And it prohibited the District from
housing more than one child in a cell.30
But the consent decree did not stop there. It established a court
monitor to track compliance, mediate disputes between the parties, and
make recommendations on how to comply with the decree.31 Other
provisions sought to regulate nearly every aspect of the facilities’
operations,32 including:
 Staffing. The consent decree mandated training standards
for newly hired line staff, created an internal compliance
unit, required a minimum ratio of one staff on duty to
supervise every ten youths during the daytime, and

25

On the effects of confining youths unnecessarily, in light of the risk they pose to public
safety and their rehabilitative needs, see generally BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG,
JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH
IN
DETENTION
AND
OTHER
SECURE
FACILITIES
(2006),
available
at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/06-11_REP_DangersOfDetention_JJ.pdf.
26
On the effects of confining too many youths in a single facility, see generally Sue
Burrell, The Human Impact of Crowding in Juvenile Detention, 13 J. FOR JUV. JUST. &
DETENTION SERVICES 42 (1998), available at http://www.ylc.org/pdfs/Human_
Impact_of_Crowding.pdf.
27
Jerry M. Consent Decree, supra note 2, at 2–5 pt. I(B)(1)–(6); see also Jerry M. v.
District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 1987) (Memorandum Order
A) at 6–7 (accepting most of the panel’s recommendations and ordering the District to
comply).
28
See, e.g., Jerry M. Complaint, supra note 18, at 5 (“Cedar Knoll is an antiquated
‘reform school’ whose buildings have become unfit for habitation. . . .”).
29
Jerry M. Consent Decree, supra note 2, at 7–8 (referring to Cedar Knoll as the “Oak
Hill Annex”).
30
Id. at 7–8.
31
Id. at 8–12. The court monitor “shall have access to all D.C. employees[,] . . . all
appropriate facilities[, and] all relevant records.” Id. at 9.
32
The consent decree stopped short of setting appropriations. See id. at 12 (“The Mayor
of the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Public Schools will take all
reasonable steps, employing their utmost diligence, to seek funds sufficient to implement
fully the provisions of this Decree.”).
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required the District to discipline staff as appropriate
while limiting their overtime.33
Individual Service Plans. The decree detailed procedures
for individualized diagnosis and treatment of educational
and behavioral needs.34
Recreation and Aftercare. The decree fixed minimum
amounts of daily exercise35 and required meetings about
aftercare.36
Mental Health and Social Services. The decree specified
staff-to-youth ratios and educational qualifications for
mental health professionals and social workers.37
Education. The decree required full compliance with the
federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act;38 set
different teacher-to-student ratios for regular academic
classes, special education classes, and classes for seriously
emotionally disturbed youths; required use of the standard
D.C. Public Schools curriculum; required an
administrative structure consisting of a principal and
assistant principal as well as a roster of available substitute
teachers; required at least five hours of school each day;
and required vocational programming.39
Discipline. The decree revised the existing disciplinary
code by reducing the maximum punishment from seven to
five days of isolation, during which time educational and
recreational services must continue.40
Use of Restraints. The decree limited the use of restraints
by enumerating the circumstances in which a youth could
wear leg irons or handcuffs and requiring a standardized
written record of every occasion on which restraints were
used.41

Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 14–20. It required, inter alia, a team leader to “supervise the cottage life staff
with respect to all areas of the youth’s [individualized service plan].” Id at 9.
35
Id. at 20–21 (requiring “large muscle activity” for a minimum of two hours, including
one hour outdoors, weather permitting).
36
Id. at 23–24. Aftercare refers to supervision of the youth after leaving locked custody.
37
Id. at 21–23.
38
See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2006).
39
Jerry M. Consent Decree, supra note 2, at 24–27.
40
Id. at 28–30.
41
Id. at 30–32.
34
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Environmental Health and Safety. The decree regulated
youths’ access to bathrooms and required adherence to
standards for food, housekeeping, laundry, waste disposal,
vermin control, plumbing, temperature controls, fire
safety, and the size of each room.42
 Medical Services and Family/Attorney Contact. The
decree required adequate onsite medical services and
access to visits and telephone calls from family or
attorneys.43
 Student Handbook. The decree required the agency to
publish all of the youths’ rights and facilities’ rules in a
student handbook, to be distributed to each youth upon
arrival.44
Throughout the consent decree, provisions fixed deadlines or required
the District to develop timetables for achieving compliance.45 One
provision stated that the decree would remain in effect—and thus that court
supervision would continue—until the monitor found “sustained and
satisfactory implementation and substantial compliance in all areas of the
Decree.”46
If the parties hoped that the decree’s specificity would facilitate
compliance, they would be disappointed. During much of the case’s
history, the government’s attempts to comply with the 1986 consent decree
were insincere and ineffectual.47 The District violated even central,
straightforward terms. For example, despite the clear mandate to close the
Cedar Knoll facility by December 1, 1987, the District continued to operate

42

Id. at 33–36.
Id. at 37–39.
44
Id. at 39–40.
45
E.g., id. at 33 (requiring the District to comply with environmental health standards by
August 1, 1988, and to produce a timetable for compliance with all requirements within two
weeks of the consent decree taking effect).
46
Id. at 11.
47
See REAGAN DALY ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL CHANGE: A PROCESS
EVALUATION OF WASHINGTON, DC’S SECURE JUVENILE PLACEMENT REFORM 4 (2011),
available at http://www.vera.org/download?file=3191/Capital-Change-process-evaluationDC-FINAL2.pdf; Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 19, at 1824 (calling the District’s juvenile
justice system “an abject failure” despite nearly a decade of court intervention).
43
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the facility—even reopening portions that it had closed48—until an act of
Congress barred any appropriations for its operation after June 1, 1993.49
At various moments, a frustrated court issued remedial orders to
enforce the decree,50 attempted to define the District’s obligations in further
detail than the decree specified,51 found the District in civil contempt,52
awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs,53 levied several million dollars in fines
for noncompliance with the decree and remedial orders,54 appointed a series
48

See Patrice Gaines-Carter, Cedar Knoll Population Up, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1985, at
B1 (stating that, in the preceding five months, “the number of youths there has quadrupled
and officials are reopening cottages”).
49
Keith A. Harriston, D.C. to Close Cedar Knoll by May 31, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1993,
at A28 (referencing an act introduced by Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-Md.), whose district
included the facility); News Brief, D.C. Empties Detention Center, WASH. POST, June 2,
1993, at D5. Congress had previously defunded all appropriations for the facility known as
Cedar Knoll, but the District renamed the reopened cottages “Oak Hill Annex” and kept
operating them. LISA FELDMAN, MICHAEL MALES & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, BUILDING BLOCKS
FOR YOUTH, A TALE OF TWO JURISDICTIONS: YOUTH CRIME AND DETENTION RATES IN
MARYLAND AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 11 (2001), available at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/tale_of_2.pdf.
50
The first judge presiding over Jerry M. issued eighteen remedial orders, labeled from
A to R, between 1986 and 1994; his successor labeled such orders with numbers, thus
sparing the District “the embarrassment of receiving Memorandum Order Z.” Holland &
Mlyniec, supra note 19, at 1823 n.232. “There have been orders to remedy violations of the
consent decree in medical care, education, environmental issues, physical abuse, lack of
programming, and overcrowding, to name a few.” Michael White et al., Symposium,
Systemic Critique and Transformation, 3 D.C. L. REV. 403, 412 (1995) (quoting Donna
Wulkan, co-counsel to the Jerry M. plaintiffs).
51
District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178, 180 (D.C. 1990) (reversing, “with
some reluctance,” trial court orders that exceeded the scope of the consent decree). The
court invalidated orders that the District construct smaller, decentralized facilities to replace
its existing secure institutions; place no more than sixty committed youths in secure
facilities; and institute wide-ranging management reforms. Id. at 179–80, 189–90.
52
Id. at 192 (affirming the trial court’s finding of contempt). The District “failed to
comply with practically every provision of the Decree,” including mandates to close Cedar
Knoll, reduce the number of youths in secure confinement, and end the practice of housing
more than one youth in a single room. Id. at 184 n.16 (quoting the trial court’s
Memorandum Order D, dated November 28, 1988).
53
District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 580 A.2d 1270, 1273, 1282 (D.C. 1990).
54
E.g., Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. April 15,
2004) (Order VIII) at 21–22 (establishing fines of $1,000 per day for failure to train staff in
making educational diagnoses, $1,000 per day for failure to convene treatment teams to
develop and review educational plans, $1,000 per day for failure to fully implement a policy
requiring treatment team leaders to supervise line staff in all areas of a youth’s treatment
plan, and $5,000 per day for failure to establish a pre-release unit outside the perimeter fence
at Oak Hill); see also Nancy Lewis, Judge’s Costly Ruling, WASH. POST, April 22, 1994, at
D1 (reporting the court’s imposition of a $1,000 fine per youth per day for overcrowding at
juvenile institutions). In imposing the fines rather than appointing a receiver, the court
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of court monitors and special masters,55 attempted to appoint a receiver in
charge of youth offenders’ education,56 and even summoned the mayor to a
“closed-door meeting about the District’s trouble-plagued juvenile
facilities.”57
None of these actions resulted in compliance with the decree.58 In
2004, the court monitor gave a “dispiriting” assessment in his fifty-second
(and final) report: “Unfortunately, much of the halting, stutter-step,
movement toward compliance seen for much of the past eighteen years
continued.”59 The plaintiffs asked the court to place the entire juvenile
justice agency in receivership.60 Before the court ruled on the motion—and
with every indication that the court intended to grant it61—the parties agreed
instead to appoint a new special arbiter with both expanded powers to
hoped that “with the right incentives[,] compliance may be achieved without substituting a
court officer for government officials.” Id. at D5 (quoting Judge Ricardo M. Urbina).
55
E.g., White et al., supra note 50, at 413 (noting the existence, at the time, of a court
monitor and separate special masters for suicide prevention, and development of a
continuum of care).
56
The D.C. Court of Appeals overturned the trial court’s order appointing an educational
receiver. District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 738 A.2d 1206, 1213–14 (D.C. 1999) (holding
that the trial court abused its discretion in appointing the receiver because it considered only
a single factor—“[t]he District’s abysmal response to its mandates for such a protracted
period of time”—without making findings with respect to other relevant factors, including
the prospects for better compliance under newly appointed management).
57
Nancy Lewis, Kelly to Skip Meeting on Youth Facilities, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1993,
at B5 (reporting that Judge Urbina invited the mayor, but also required the director of the
Department of Human Services to attend). Mayor Sharon Pratt (née Kelly) declined the
invitation, citing her concern for the separation of powers and her “ability as chief executive
to function through executive agencies.” Id. The director, Vincent C. Gray, became mayor
in 2011 and surely has an opinion on the separation of powers.
58
See AUSTIN A. ANDERSEN, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (D.C.), OIG NO. 030014YS, YOUTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION PART ONE: OAK HILL YOUTH CENTER 22 (Mar.
30, 2004) (on file with the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology) (stating that “many of
the same types of problems that resulted in the 1986 lawsuit against the District and the
subsequent Decree . . . still exist 17 years later,” and reporting that, as of October 2003, the
District “still was not in full compliance with approximately one-third of the 185 provisions
of the Decree”).
59
Fifty-Second Report of the Monitor at 1–2, Jerry M., C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Oct. 8, 2004).
60
See Jerry M., C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 13, 2004) (order approving
memorandum of agreement providing for a special arbiter) at 1.
61
Judge Herbert B. Dixon Jr. issued a scathing order the previous month, concluding: “It
is bewildering to this member of the court that over three years after the renewed pledges to
achieve compliance with the Consent Decree . . . defendants continue to address fundamental
provisions of the Consent Decree in isolation, with a flurry of attention prior to or following
court involvement.” Jerry M., C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2004) (Order
VIII) at 20.
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monitor implementation of the decree and new authority to make a binding
recommendation to the court on whether a receiver should run the entire
youth corrections agency.62
At the same time, the legislature reorganized the juvenile corrections
agency by making it a cabinet-level agency whose director reported directly
to the mayor.63 Together, the new agency and special arbiter constituted a
last-ditch effort that appeared likely, at best, to postpone receivership.64
Receivership appeared not only an inevitable outcome of the litigation, but
the only way to improve the District’s juvenile correctional institutions; a
plaintiff’s expert even advised the agency’s new director to plan for it.65
And then something miraculous happened.66 After decades of
recalcitrance, the District—pushed by pressure from the public and
politicians, and pulled by a team of reform-oriented administrators—made
the kind of dramatic progress that had eluded consent decrees,

62

Jerry M., C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 13, 2004) (order approving
memorandum of agreement providing for a special arbiter). The special arbiter, Grace M.
Lopes, had previously served as the general counsel to Mayor Anthony A. Williams. Thus,
the court monitor wrote in his final report that “the appointment of a Special Arbiter . . . who
has worked with the current Mayor, and who, therefore, will have access to him, and his
considerable authority, when necessary, are both indications that the future may offer more
promise than the past.” Fifty-Second Report of the Monitor, supra note 59, at 1.
63
See Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services Establishment Act of 2004, 52 D.C.
Reg. 2025, D.C. Law 15-335 (Apr. 12, 2005) (codified at D.C. CODE §§ 2-1515.01–21515.10 (LexisNexis 2001)). Previously, the agency had been known as the Youth Services
Administration (YSA), a division of the larger Department of Human Services. Today it is
the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS). See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
64
See Theola S. Labbé, Acting Chief Articulates His Juvenile Justice Plan, WASH. POST,
Feb. 26, 2005, at B3 (“Peter J. Nickles, an attorney for juveniles in the Jerry M. Consent
Decree, testified [to the city council] that Schiraldi’s nomination and the creation of the
Cabinet-level Youth Rehabilitation Services Department were reasons he had not pushed for
the District’s juvenile justice system to be put into receivership . . . . ‘If it’s not done this
time, there won’t be any other option but to take the system away from the District,’ Nickles
said.”). Nickles was later appointed the District’s attorney general, a position he held from
2008 to 2010. See infra text accompanying note 368.
65
See Vincent N. Schiraldi, Remarks to the National Academy of Sciences, Committee
on Assessing Juvenile Justice (Oct. 12, 2010), at 2 (on file with the author) (stating that Paul
DeMuro, a veteran of several reform efforts nationwide and the Jerry M. saga, believed that
receivership was inevitable and advised Schiraldi to “develop a strategy to get appointed
Receiver because that was the only way we’d ever fix this place”) [hereinafter Remarks].
66
See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 178 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter HUMAN
CONDITION] (“The new always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws
and their probability, which for all practical, everyday purposes amounts to certainty; the
new therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle. The fact that man is capable of
action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform what
is infinitely improbable.”).
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memorandum orders, court monitors, and contempt findings. Some of the
changes were programmatic, such as the District’s full integration of
therapeutic treatment with the educational programming for youths in
secure confinement.67 Other changes were more concrete: the District met a
statutory deadline to replace the dilapidated Oak Hill Youth Center with the
state-of-the-art New Beginnings Youth Development Center, a facility
where therapeutic principles “are embodied both in the programming and
the physical environment.”68
Though the lawsuit remains active, there is no denying that the
District’s juvenile correctional facilities became vastly more humane in a
relatively short time.69 By December 2007, the plaintiffs were so
encouraged by the agency’s improvements that they withdrew their motion
to appoint a receiver.70 The District even became a model of reform for
other jurisdictions with troubled juvenile correctional systems. 71
If juvenile justice reform can happen in the District of Columbia, it can
happen anywhere.72 This Comment examines the interaction between the
lawsuit and actual reform. From the perspectives of several role-players
with distinct interests, this Comment demonstrates that overly abstract
views of institutional reform litigation gloss over complex practical
challenges of the highest importance. The District’s frustrating experience
of judicially driven efforts suggests that this case study can illuminate some
of the real obstacles to reform and ways in which court intervention
addressed or ignored those obstacles. Finally, the District’s tiny scale
67

DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 16.
Id. at 15; see also Omnibus Juvenile Justice Act of 2004, § 1102, 52 D.C. Reg. 1188,
D.C. Law 15-261 (effective Mar. 17, 2005) (codified at D.C. CODE § 24-941 (LexisNexis
2001)) (establishing a statutory mandate to close Oak Hill).
69
Vincent N. Schiraldi, Op-Ed, In D.C., A Promise Kept in Juvenile Justice, WASH.
POST, Jan. 31, 2010, at C5 (quoting plaintiffs’ counsel’s 2008 assessment that DYRS “has
made more progress toward achieving the goals of the Consent Decree in the past three years
than we had seen in the previous 20 years of this lawsuit”).
70
E.g., DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 4, n.15.
71
See, e.g., Radio: Robert Wildeboer, Inside and Out: Building a New Prison Culture in
D.C. (WBEZ 91.5 FM broadcast June 16, 2010), available at http://www.wbez.org/series/
inside-and-out (audio recording and written transcript) (examining the District’s reform
effort for lessons applicable to Illinois).
72
Over the course of its involvement in a host of institutional reform lawsuits, which
date as far back as 1974 and include seven that are active today, the District has earned a
reputation for being impossible to reform. See, e.g., Mike DeBonis, Getting the Courts to
Stop
Governing
D.C.,
WASH.
CITY
PAPER
(Jan.
15,
2010),
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/38334/getting-the-courts-to-stop-governingdc; see also infra note 162 (summarizing the District’s unsuccessful attempt to terminate the
suits in 2010).
68
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narrows the number of factors bearing on the opportunities and barriers that
may also exist in other states (notwithstanding the unwieldy length of this
Comment).73
III. THE IDEAS IN THE BACKGROUND
In the abstract, judicial intervention seems like an appealing route to
reform. Institutional reform litigation presents courts with a variety of
available remedies that might be appropriate, depending on the suit’s
context.74 Accordingly, this Part begins by briefly mentioning modern
tenets of juvenile corrections reform. This Part then proceeds to consider
evolving theories of institutional reform litigation, with an eye towards
prisons and juvenile facilities.
A. OVERVIEW OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONS REFORM

Juvenile corrections exists in tension with the adult prison system.
Juvenile justice systems are creatures of Progressive Era statutes growing
from a belief that the state’s interest in rehabilitating delinquent juveniles is
fundamentally different from its need to punish hardened adult criminals.75
Yet comparisons with the adult system are inevitable, and the reemergence
of the notion that serious offenders should be punished severely no matter
their age has returned with profound effects on juvenile justice.76
All too often, incarcerated youths are subjected to conditions that are
difficult, if not brutal. Incarcerated youths may suffer beatings from staff or
other youths.77 Corporal punishment may be rendered against a youth who
73
Cf. White et al., supra note 50, at 418 (expressing Jerome Miller’s belief that “reform
should not be all that difficult,” particularly in the District, because there are relatively few
people in the juvenile justice system and because institutions are expensive to operate
compared to community-based alternatives to incarceration).
74
See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 86–91 (1978) [hereinafter CIVIL
RIGHTS INJUNCTION] (arguing that courts should use the remedy appearing most likely to
succeed under the circumstances, instead of disfavoring equitable remedies unless there is no
adequate remedy at law).
75
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1967); see also David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A.
Drizin, “Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused”: The Changing Legal Response to
Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 645–46 (2002) (describing the
origins of the Illinois Juvenile Court, the first in the nation). To the extent that juvenile court
acts create statutory rights, they can impose higher standards on the conditions of
confinement than the minimal Eighth Amendment standards.
76
See, e.g., Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 75, at 641–42 (referencing the contribution
of rhetoric about unrepentant juvenile “superpredators” to the limits placed on juvenile court
jurisdiction in the 1990s).
77
Interviews conducted in 2003 of a nationally representative sample found that 40% of
youths in locked custody reported being afraid of being physically attacked by someone,
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acts out78 or against an entire unit collectively if one member acts out.79
Youths may be put on “lockdowns,” in which they are confined to the
isolation of their rooms for hours at a time, either as a punishment or for
administrative convenience.80
While improving the conditions of confinement is certainly on the
agenda, it is not the top priority for some leading juvenile justice
reformers.81 Instead, “[t]he most urgent need is to reduce our wasteful,
counterproductive overreliance on incarceration and detention, and instead
to redirect resources into proven strategies that cost less, enhance public
safety, and increase the success of youth who come in contact with the
juvenile courts.”82 In other words, this approach involves keeping courtinvolved youths out of secure confinement except when they truly belong
there.
For youths who appropriately belong in secure confinement, reformers
seek to create environments focused on rehabilitation; Missouri has

27% feared attacks from staff, and 25% from other youths. ANDREA J. SEDLAK & KARLA S.
MCPHERSON, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT: FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY OF YOUTH IN RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT, 1–2, 7
tbl.5 (May 2010), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/227729.pdf. With
respect to the District, see, e.g., Barton Gellman, Abuse by Staff is Reported at Oak Hill,
WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1989, at A1 (reporting that serious violence did not appear to be
routine, but that incidents created a climate where “violence is feared and expected” by
youths and staff alike).
78
Gellman, supra note 77 (reporting that an organized group of staff beat misbehaving
youths on various occasions using “a brick, a knife, metal implements, a chair, milk cartons,
and their fists”).
79
E.g., Benjamin Weiser, Youth Facility Policy, Reality Clash, WASH. POST, Oct. 26,
1985, at A1 [hereinafter Youth Facility Policy] (stating that staff administered “a hideously
painful punishment” to an entire unit of youths for two hours because “somebody had
thrown salt into somebody’s hair in the dining room”).
80
E.g., White et al., supra note 50, at 415 (stating that at Oak Hill, lockdowns could last
up to seven hours at a time, either for disciplinary reasons or because there are not enough
staff on the unit).
81
E.g., MENDEL, supra note 4, at 28–37 (listing six priorities for juvenile justice reform,
of which only the fifth priority pertains to conditions of confinement). The Annie E. Casey
Foundation, a national advocacy organization that also has major initiatives in education and
child welfare, observed that “among all of the policy areas affecting vulnerable children and
families, juvenile justice probably suffers the most glaring gaps between best practice and
common practice, between what we know works and what our public systems most often do
on our behalf.” ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF: REFORM THE NATION’S JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF], available
at http://www.aecf.org/~/media/PublicationFiles/Juvenile_Justice_issuebrief3.pdf.
82
ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 81, at 1.
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developed a system that epitomizes this approach.83 In the “Missouri
model,” secure facilities are small and homelike settings, rather than large,
impersonal institutions.84 Staff members maintain safety and order by
developing relationships with youths, instead of through extensive use of
isolation and overreliance on sophisticated surveillance technology.85 More
generally, the role of staff goes far beyond mere supervision and seeks to
facilitate the positive development of youths.86
Though these approaches are very different from traditional
incarceration practices, they do not represent a set of brand new ideas but
instead advocate a “return to the roots” of juvenile justice systems. 87
Likewise, conditions litigation in this field seeks to correct the abuses of
wayward institutions and to restore the rehabilitative purpose envisioned at
the time juvenile justice systems were created by statute.88
B. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION IN THEORY

Like institutional reform lawsuits themselves, scholarly consideration
of this subject is only a few decades old.89 As this Part will show, the early
scholarship sought to develop a framework for understanding late-twentieth
century judicial interventions that used wide-ranging injunctive remedies to
address public policy problems.90 As these lawsuits proliferated, backlash
followed; critics questioned both the efficacy and the legitimacy of the
83

See, e.g., Mark Soler, Dana Schoenberg & Marc Schindler, Juvenile Justice: Lessons
for a New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 483, 525 (2009).
84
MENDEL, MISSOURI MODEL, supra note 9, at 2.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Jeffrey M. Y. Hammer, Hon. Curtis Heaston & Diane N. Walsh, Denying Child
Welfare Services to Delinquent Teens: A Call to Return to the Roots of Illinois’ Juvenile
Court, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 925, 929 (2005) (citing Julian W. Mack, The Chancery
Procedure in the Juvenile Court, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT 310, 310 (1925))
(discussing the approach of the early Illinois Juvenile Court, which looked beyond simple
adjudication of guilt to determine and address the reasons why a youth offended).
88
See, e.g., U.S. v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973, 974–75, 979 (D.D.C. 1971) (finding that
overcrowded conditions at a D.C. correctional center violated the essentially rehabilitative
purpose of the Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010–16 (repealed by Pub. L. 98-473,
98 Stat. 2027 (Oct. 27, 1984)), which provided separately for low-level adult offenders under
age twenty-two).
89
Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison
Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 552, 564 (2006) (dating institutional reform litigation
to the 1955 decision in Brown v. Board and scholarly attention to the “canonical treatments”
of the topic by Abram Chayes and Owen Fiss in the 1970s).
90
See generally, e.g., FISS, CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION, supra note 74 (considering the
civil rights injunction as a device for making policy in various contexts).
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lawsuits.91 Institutional reform lawsuits, especially over jails and prisons,
fell out of newspapers and law journals alike; however, they had not
disappeared, but rather changed in ways scholars generally failed to
appreciate.92 Some contemporary defenders emphasize litigation’s ability
to break up a malevolent institutional order.93 While having some merit,
this perspective glosses over the difficulty of building a new institutional
culture because it supposes that reform will happen as soon as politicians
want it to happen.94 As other defenders have argued, understanding the
actual and often peculiar bureaucratic and political factors in play is a task
of the highest importance.95
1. Origins of Institutional Reform Litigation
First, it will be useful to summarize the arc of institutional reform
litigation and its antecedent, public law litigation. “Public law litigation” is
Professor Chayes’s term, referring broadly to cases where “the subject
matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private individuals about
private rights, but a grievance about the operation of public policy.” 96
These suits persist after the court has ordered a remedy; the court remains
involved to ensure that compliance with an injunction or decree honors the
public rights that have been violated.97 Professor Chayes broadly applied
91

E.g., John J. DiIulio, Jr., Conclusion: What Judges Can Do to Improve Prisons and
Jails, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 281, 291, 317 (John DiIulio ed.,
1990) [hereinafter What Judges Can Do] (granting that prison litigation contributed to
improvements in prison conditions, but suggesting that the improvements would have
happened in a less disruptive manner without court intervention); id. at 319–20 (arguing that
judicial intervention in prison administration is inappropriate).
92
See Schlanger, supra note 89, at 553–57 (refuting the conventional wisdom that prison
litigation withered during the 1980s and died in 1996 with passage of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act).
93
E.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2004) (understanding “public law cases
as core instances of ‘destabilization rights’—rights to disentrench an institution that has
systematically failed to meet its obligations and remained immune to traditional forces of
political correction”).
94
See id. at 1073 (supposing that “experimentalist” approaches to crafting remedies in
institutional reform suits will expose noncompliance, bringing broader scrutiny to
institutions and spurring political branches to intervene).
95
See Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 639, 646 (1993) (“Too often, scholars and advocates ignore [the political context
surrounding the institutions subject to litigation] and offer overarching generalizations about
litigation’s impact and potential.”).
96
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1302 (1976).
97
Id.
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his term to include suits enforcing public rights against the government
(such as school desegregation cases and suits over substandard conditions
in prisons or mental institutions), as well as those enforcing public rights
against private parties (including antitrust, corporate governance, consumer
protection, and housing discrimination).98 In the course of these suits, the
judge assumes an extraordinary role in ordering complex injunctive relief
and supervising its implementation by the defendant.99
Institutional reform litigation is a subset of public law litigation in
which plaintiffs, typically joined as a class, seek enforcement of their public
rights against the government.100 In the prototypical decision of Brown v.
Board of Education, the Court’s remand gave district courts broad license
to enter orders and decrees that would desegregate public schools.101 In one
view, which is not terribly troubled by the separation of powers and
federalism objections raised against it, a heroic judge can reform the system
by ordering the policies that politicians were afraid to make.102 In the early
1970s, federal courts began entering the first orders broadly aimed at
reforming conditions in adult prisons and jails.103 Though falling short of
the most ambitious reform goals, these suits helped improve some of the
most dramatically deficient conditions; they also prompted the
professionalization and bureaucratization of prison systems.104 Some other
suits sought to improve juvenile facilities, but they were fewer in number;
substandard conditions in these facilities persisted in many states.105

98

Id. at 1284. For a critique of the increasing use of federal criminal prosecutions to
force corporate defendants to undertake internal reforms, see Brandon L. Garrett, Structural
Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007).
99
FISS, CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION, supra note 74, at 26–27; Chayes, supra note 96, at
1301.
100
Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV.
428, 428 (1977).
101
See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 89, at 552 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka,
Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)); cf. Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1954) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954) (“Courts are without power to supervise prison
administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or regulations . . . . No
authorities are needed to support th[is] statement[].”).
102
See FISS, CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION, supra note 74, at 90, 93; Fiss, Forms of Justice,
supra note 15, at 2.
103
Schlanger, supra note 89, at 552 n.4.
104
Sturm, supra note 95, at 665–69, 674.
105
Id. at 698.
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2. Backlash Against Institutional Reform Litigation
The golden age of institutional reform litigation did not last long
before commentators counterattacked against the suits.106 First, these critics
charged that court supervision usurped the executive’s authority to manage
prisons and the legislature’s authority to set standards and appropriate
funds.107 As a practical matter, there is almost no check or restraint on the
power assumed by judges and masters.108 If they seek to avoid contempt,
the executive and legislature have no choice but to comply with orders to
build new facilities, hire more staff, or create procedural rights for
inmates.109 A consent decree is unappealable by definition, since both
parties agreed to the court’s entry of the settlement; likewise, a master’s
determinations are effectively final because the trial court rarely reverses its
own representative, who defendants may not wish to antagonize.110 In
addition, critics charged that federal judges conducting sweeping reviews of
the management of state institutions had exceeded the bounds of federalism
and ignored the separation of powers principle.111 But as part of a broader
defense of prison litigation, some argued that judicial policymaking is a
necessary consequence of the courts’ legitimate adjudication of Eighth
Amendment rights and the concomitant implementation of remedies.112
Even if we assume that court intervention is legitimate, there may be
several reasons to doubt its effectiveness.113 Whether courts have the right
106

Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1037 (referring to a “backlash” in the late 1980s);
Schlanger, supra note 89, at 564.
107
E.g., DIIULIO, GOVERNING PRISONS, supra note 11, at 229.
108
A judge’s order can only be appealed (if at all) to another judge. The Prison
Litigation Reform Act, discussed infra, underscores the power legislatures have to stop the
flow of institutional reform lawsuits.
109
See, e.g., Anthony DiSarro, Six Decrees of Separation: Settlement Agreements and
Consent Orders in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 317–18 (2010) (noting
that a consent decree, unlike a settlement, is an order of the court; the court’s interest in
enforcement is independent of the parties’ interests, legal or otherwise).
110
See Clair A. Cripe, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: A Practitioner’s View,
in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 91, at 268, 274–75.
111
See, e.g., John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent
Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1140–41 (1996). Of
course, in the District of Columbia the principles of federalism hardly constrain the federal
courts. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Judicial Activism or Judicial Necessity: The D.C.
District Court’s Criminal Justice Legacy, 90 GEO. L.J. 685, 686 (2002).
112
See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE 380–81 (1998).
113
Alternatively, one could simply assume that litigation is effective. See GORDON
SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE 21 (2009) (charging that policy entrepreneurs, politicians, and
lawyers act on such an assumption without empirical evidence).
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tools to change complex institutions—or use the tools they have in the right
ways—is a matter of some controversy. John DiIulio charged that a judge
sitting in chambers is helpless to implement change or even understand the
basic operations of a distant institution.114 Even the assistance of special
masters is not helpful if courts make poor use of them—for example, by
appointing as masters individuals (often trained as lawyers) who lack
correctional expertise.115 Ideally, judges themselves are selected because
they are outstanding lawyers, not strong managers, and so the special
master might lack sound guidance.116 Lastly, ongoing court supervision
entails high costs in attorney fees and masters’ expenses, which can
generate skepticism about whether the attorneys and masters are interested
in solving problems or in perpetuating their incomes.117
With respect to prison litigation, these counterattacks on legitimacy
and effectiveness—combined with the perceived avalanche of prisoners’
meritless pro se suits—led Congress to enact the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA).118 Although the PLRA facilitated the dismissal of existing
prison lawsuits and frustrated the initiation of new ones, prison litigation
endures.119 Notably, the PLRA applies to litigation over conditions in
juvenile justice facilities, even though juvenile lawsuits have not flooded
the courts to any comparable extent.120

114

See DIIULIO, GOVERNING PRISONS, supra note 11, at 229. For a vigorous criticism of
DiIulio’s views on judicial intervention and ideal prison management, see Sturm, supra note
95, at 657–60.
115
See Cripe, supra note 110, at 274 (conceding that special masters typically have other
skills—including an ability to mediate conflicts—that can have value in implementation).
116
See id. at 274. In addition to management skills, successful implementation of an
institutional reform order requires an understanding of local political sensibilities—another
quality that judges might not have. See Sturm, supra note 95, at 646.
117
See DIIULIO, GOVERNING PRISONS, supra note 11, at 216.
118
Title VIII of Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321–66 (1996); see Margo Schlanger &
Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and Prisons: The Case for
Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139, 141 (2008); see also
Schlanger, supra note 89, at 556 (stating that progressive policymakers incorrectly assumed
that prison litigation had declined before the PLRA, so that there was diminished value in
continuing prison litigation).
119
Schlanger, supra note 89, at 554–55. Even after the PLRA, modern-day consent
decrees involving juvenile facilities can be just as broad as that in Jerry M. See, e.g.,
Gerhardstein, supra note 14, at 19–20 (listing the guiding principles of a 2008 consent
decree involving Ohio’s juvenile justice system).
120
Schlanger & Shay, supra note 118, at 152; see also Anna Rapa, Comment, One Brick
Too Many: The Prison Litigation Reform Act As a Barrier to Legitimate Juvenile Lawsuits,
23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 263, 273–74 (2006).
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3. Modern Institutional Reform Litigation
The PLRA and the theoretical backlash against institutional reform
litigation did more to diminish scholarly commentary for a few years than
to block the suits themselves.121 Still, some recent commentators have
identified ways in which institutional reform litigation has evolved since its
inception.122
Most importantly for present purposes, Sabel and Simon argue that the
implementation of remedies has moved beyond the traditional “commandand-control” model, in which the judge directs institutional reforms by
issuing detailed, regulation-style orders that the bureaucracy must
execute.123 Instead, modern courts tend to adopt an “experimentalist”
approach, in which all parties (including advocates for the institution’s
clients) collaborate to craft consensus-driven remedies.124 On this view,
public law litigation enforces a “destabilization right”—that is, a right to
destabilize the political order that has led an institution to a dysfunctional
breaking point.125 In the juvenile justice context, line staff may beat
children because they want control of the institution, and politicians may
allow this state of affairs to persist because they are unwilling to offend the
staff’s labor union and because the political process fails to account for the
interests of youth offenders. The court’s involvement signals that this order
cannot continue and calls upon government defendants (personified by
politicians and head bureaucrats) to negotiate an acceptable set of reforms
with advocates for youth offenders.126 If the defendants fail to cooperate,
then they “will suffer loss of independence and increased uncertainty” when
the court enters remedial orders.127
Perhaps most ambitiously, Sabel and Simon describe how public law
litigation can invoke the venerable political tradition of enlarged interest.128

121

Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1018–19; Schlanger, supra note 89, at 556; see also
Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still Moving!,
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 147 (2003).
122
E.g., Schlanger, supra note 89, at 569, 605 (noting a marked shift away from
judgments and towards consent decrees, which caused the suits to fall out of case reporters;
arguing that institutional reform lawsuits narrowed their focus to making specific
improvements rather than trying to achieve wholesale reform).
123
Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1018–19, 1021–22.
124
Id. at 1053.
125
Id. at 1055 (attributing this term to Roberto Mangabeira Unger).
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 1076 (citing AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT 37–39 (1996)).
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With liberal joinder rules, stakeholders (such as public employee unions,
which are not commonly named as parties) can participate in fashioning a
remedy.129 With each stakeholder compelled to give reasons for its position
during negotiations, the participants may find their positions altered by the
illuminating articulation of other stakeholders’ real interests.130
Sabel and Simon point out the “important background premise” that
institutional reform litigation is appropriate when political processes are
unwilling or unable to cure the government’s failure to meet minimally
acceptable standards.131 Perhaps a small group with large stakes (for
instance, staff in an institution for delinquent youths) effectively gets its
way despite the desires of larger but diffuse groups (such as members of the
general public who object to the mistreatment of youth offenders).132 Or it
may be that a poor state of affairs can only improve through mutually
beneficial coordination (dangerous detention centers are dangerous for staff
no less than for youth; a shared interest in safety could be the basis of some
improvements) but parties perceive that coordination is impossible.133
Sabel and Simon believe that court intervention can make reform more
likely in both these situations.134
Other defenders of institutional reform litigation argue that “litigation
causes change,” although there are limits to what lawsuits themselves can
achieve directly.135 True reform depends on the existence of “committed
state legislators and detention center administrators.”136 In some cases,
judicial intervention and accompanying media attention created political
momentum for prison reform; yet in others, the adversarial process turns
even sympathetic administrators hostile to court intervention.137
At a theoretical level, these defenses of institutional reform litigation
are open to criticism. First, they argue that suits can be successful, even if
129

Id. at 1067–68. But cf. Patrice Gaines-Carter & Elsa Walsh, 7 Juveniles Escape From
Cedar Knoll, WASH. POST, July 19, 1986, at B1 (recounting an episode in which a group of
forty-six staff members sought to express its concerns to the Jerry M. court; one member of
the group charged that the decree “gives total control of the institution to the kids”).
130
Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1076–77.
131
Id. at 1062, 1064.
132
Id. at 1064–65 (stating that Chayes emphasized this pattern).
133
Id. at 1065.
134
Id. at 1066.
135
Dale, supra note 10, at 732; see also Gerhardstein, supra note 14, at 15 (asserting that
narrow enforcement of minimum standards on conditions of confinement does nothing to
promote “the ultimate goal of living safely in a free society upon release without reoffending”).
136
Dale, supra note 10, at 733.
137
Sturm, supra note 95, at 684.
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they do not directly resolve the problem, so long as they persuade
politicians in the executive or legislature to treat seriously the deficiencies
and the need for reform. In other words, it is assumed that executives and
legislatures are the problem: once courts supply the right political
commitment, reform of complex systems will follow. This view does not
account for the possibility of agency costs; the government will simply be
what politicians want it to be, because agency heads will give the right
commands and agency staff will execute them.138
At best, this
understanding of executive power is incomplete; proceeding along this line
will most likely lead to a considerable amount of frustration.139
Finally, a court’s intervention via institutional reform litigation also
raises the question of its political responsibility.140 One is accustomed to
hearing of a governor or an agency director called to account for the
intolerable conditions existing in an institution. If he fails to improve the
situation, the governor is liable to lose control of the agency or pay fines
ordered by the court. The governor bears political responsibility, and he
cannot defend himself by saying that he has not personally abused any child
in the institution. Yet the court rarely grasps that, from the moment it
intervenes with orders to the executive branch, it too becomes politically
responsible for the system and its future performance.141 Thus, the court
shares in the failure whenever its remedial decree does not bring about the
change desired.
IV. THEORY AND PRACTICE CAN BE VERY DIFFERENT
In one sense, an institutional reform lawsuit is successful when it
results in a court order or consent decree that mandates reforms. But it has
long been recognized that institutional implementation of the reforms is
both more important and more difficult than prevailing in court.142
138

See ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 66, at 188–90, 222–23 (recognizing the
fundamental difference between ruling and doing, the two kinds of action in a hierarchy).
139
See RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS 10
(3d ed. 1990) (quoting the incumbent Harry Truman, who imagined how then-candidate
Dwight Eisenhower would fare as president: “[H]e’ll say, ‘Do this! Do that!’ And nothing
will happen. Poor Ike—it won’t be a bit like the Army. He’ll find it very frustrating.”).
140
See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDGMENT 149–53 (2005)
(contrasting individualized moral or legal responsibility with political responsibility, in
which a member of a society is vicariously responsible for all acts done in his name).
141
Cf. Chayes, supra note 96, at 1292 (“[B]y issuing the injunction, the court takes
public responsibility for any consequences of its decree that may adversely affect strangers
to the action.”).
142
See, e.g., id. at 1302 (“The decree does not terminate judicial involvement in the
affair: its administration requires the continuing participation of the court.”).
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This Part examines the interactions between the Jerry M. lawsuit, the
broader goals of juvenile corrections reform, and the behavior of the actors
who play a role in implementation. One might expect that institutional
interests—interests assigned by a person’s position in the bureaucratic
landscape rather than by any personal values—would determine how each
actor behaves. For example, a chief executive would always oppose court
intervention that diminishes his power over an executive branch agency.143
While institutional interests certainly exist and inform behavior, they do not
determine behavior. Thus, one chief executive might welcome the court’s
intervention while a successor might bitterly resist it—and in some cases
the same executive might reverse his position to do both.144 The
examination proceeds one group at a time, but the reader should bear in
mind that these groups consist of individual members who might act
atypically.
It should also be said that the groups profiled here are not the only
ones worthy of consideration. Middle management is extremely important
to the effectiveness of large organizations.145 Likewise, the youth offenders
themselves play a central role in a juvenile corrections agency.146 However,
neither group figures prominently into this Comment’s point about judicial
intervention, and therefore neither is considered here. For the sake of
simplicity, this Comment generally avoids the educational component of
the District’s reforms, which tended to observe the same arc as the
corrections-oriented portions of the decree.147

143

Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1055 (supposing that government officials comply
with institutional reform orders rather than risk losing control to enhanced judicial
intervention).
144
One observer characterized the principles of Marion S. Barry Jr., the District’s mayor
in 1979–1990 and 1995–1998, as “situationist.” David Remnick, The Situationist, NEW
YORKER, Sept. 5, 1994, at 84. On the prevalence of these views among politicians, consider
an oft-repeated maxim of Everett Dirksen (for whom the U.S. Senate has named one of its
three office buildings): “I am a man of fixed and unbending principles, the first of which is
to be flexible at all times.” E.g., Alan Ehrenhalt, Defying Proverbial Wisdom, GOVERNING,
Dec. 2006, at 11.
145
See DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 21–22 (mentioning the importance of committed
middle managers to the District’s implementation of reforms).
146
See Soler et al., supra note 83, at 526–29 (illustrating the District’s “Positive Youth
Development” philosophy of rehabilitation).
147
Compare Julie Wakefield, Juvenile Delinquencies, WASH. CITY PAPER (May 16,
1997),
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/12695/juvenile-delinquencies
(describing the District’s disastrous attempt to place the Oak Hill school in the hands of a
private educational contractor), with DALY ET AL. supra note 47, at 11, 15–18 (describing the
successful replacement of Oak Hill’s public school with a high-performing charter school in
the mid-2000s).

924

WILL SINGER

[Vol. 102

The purpose of this examination is not to assign blame or secondguess old decisions, but to illustrate the kinds of barriers that future
reformers may encounter and must overcome.148 The District’s experience
shows that a highly detailed consent decree will not foster compliance,
except perhaps in an unusual case where the institution’s leading deficiency
is that it adopted the wrong standards. More generally, this Part argues that
consent decrees and the efforts of courts and parties are most effective when
they are grounded in a realistic appraisal of the institution’s central
deficiencies.
Finally, it is worthwhile to restate the main goals of the District’s
reformers.149 Since the inception of Jerry M., plaintiffs sought to reduce the
number of youths held inappropriately in secure confinement by developing
community-based alternatives to incarceration, especially for youths
awaiting trial.150 Additionally, plaintiffs sought to improve the quality of
rehabilitative programming inside secure facilities and to ameliorate
dangerous conditions related to the physical plant.151 Even relatively
straightforward deficiencies resisted remediation over time.152 As we will
see, the District’s implementation of reforms became a matter of great
controversy in local politics.153

148

See Sturm, supra note 95, at 647 (“If litigation has not been successful in the past, one
must ask whether there is reason to devote substantial resources to it in the future. It is also
important to understand why and under what circumstances litigation has prompted
improvements in correctional institutions.”).
149
See supra text accompanying notes 23–46 (summarizing the provisions of the Jerry
M. Consent Decree).
150
A classic example of inappropriate confinement involves the so-called PINS (persons
in need of supervision), who are in reality mere status offenders—truants, runaways, and
curfew violators. When these offenders are placed in secure facilities, they interact in
counterproductive ways with more serious and violent offenders. White et al., supra note
50, at 414–15. The interaction is negative, as is the separation from routines of schooling
and family life that, in most cases, present far more appropriate means of keeping the youths
on a path towards productive adulthood.
151
Id.
152
As Donna Wulkan, plaintiffs’ co-counsel, said: “It seems that these issues have a life
of their own. We have been in court on TROs [regarding] temperature control, and we are
back in court again, years later, essentially on a motion for contempt on temperature
controls.” Id.
153
See, e.g., Colbert I. King, Op-Ed, A Farce Known as Youth Rehabilitation, WASH.
POST, Dec. 15, 2007, at A21 (disbelieving “the rosy scenario painted by DYRS director
Vincent Schiraldi and his devotees” in light of separate anecdotes about a “riotous situation”
inside a secure facility and a youth who ran away from a community-based group home, then
was seen later at a city council hearing); Robert E. Pierre, Violent Youths in D.C. Being
Jailed Longer, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2007, at B1 (recounting a city council hearing at which
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A. SENIOR STAFF AND AGENCY MANAGEMENT

The effectiveness of management can determine an organization’s
success or failure.154 This statement retains its truth even where a court
intervenes in a government agency’s operations.155 This Section contrasts a
protracted period during which management of the District’s juvenile
corrections agency was in disarray with a later period of greater clarity of
purpose. With capable management, the District achieved far more
progress towards reforming its juvenile correctional facilities and
complying with the Jerry M. consent decree. In summary, this Part argues
that without capable and cooperative management, litigation is unlikely to
cause the desired reforms.
1. A Series of Ineffective Leaders
For much of the Jerry M. era, an extremely high turnover rate
diminished the effectiveness of agency management: in the eighteen years
between 1986 and 2004, the District’s Youth Services Administration had a
series of nineteen top administrators.156 Naturally, they varied significantly
in their approaches to juvenile corrections and their management abilities.
Some early administrators received credit (at least from executive branch
colleagues) for caring about kids157 or identifying major management

“[n]ational and local experts chided critics who have suggested in recent columns by
Washington Post columnist Colbert I. King that Schiraldi is ‘soft’ on criminals”).
154
See, e.g., CHARLES O’REILLY, CASE HR-11, NEW UNITED MOTORS MANUFACTURING,
INC. (NUMMI) 4–6 (rev. ed. 2004), available at http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/cases/
documents/HR11.pdf (describing a famous General Motors manufacturing plant in Fremont,
California). Shirking responsibility, substance abuse, and sabotage characterized the
Fremont plant’s workforce; the plant was GM’s least productive and arguably lowest quality.
Id. at 4. After a joint venture introduced Toyota manufacturing principles, which
emphasized trust between management and workers, the plant transformed into one of GM’s
best—while retaining much of “a work force that GM had written off.” Id. at 6.
155
See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger A. Hanson, The Impact of Judicial
Intervention on Prisons and Jails: A Framework for Analysis and a Review of the Literature,
in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 91, at 12, 21–28
(summarizing various criticisms of the effect of judicial intervention on prison management).
156
See DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 21 (“YSA directors frequently tried to introduce
changes at Oak Hill, but because top leadership changed frequently, facility staff viewed the
reforms as nothing more than short-term initiatives that they could wait out.”).
157
E.g., Margaret Engel, Head of D.C. Youth Services Fired as Probes Continue, WASH.
POST, May 31, 1986, at A7 (quoting a government spokesperson describing Patricia Quann,
the first administrator of the Jerry M. era, as “someone who cared very much about the job
and the children she was trying to help,” but saying that Quann faced “a very difficult
situation” as a manager).
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problems.158 Later administrators adopted an attitude that the court
regarded as “ideologically hostile” to the decree’s goals.159 Whatever their
intentions, none made much improvement.160 In 2004, the District’s
inspector general concluded that the agency’s “leadership void has a very
negative impact on discipline, dedication, morale, and loyalty. Too many
employees are not performing their day-to-day tasks satisfactorily, which,
in turn, results in operational breakdowns across the board in security,
oversight, monitoring of youths, . . . [and] other areas.”161
In the lifetime of an institutional reform lawsuit, the most important
senior managers may be those who negotiate the consent decree.162 This
first generation of managers establishes the terms that endure until the
government performs163—often long after that generation has departed.164
158

E.g., Victoria Churchville & Barton Gellman, D.C. Youth Services Chief Reportedly
Told to Resign, WASH. POST, June 6, 1989, at D1 (stating that Jesse E. Williams authored a
critical assessment of the agency in 1983, years before he came to the agency, and noting
sources’ views that, as administrator, Williams “pressed with little success for the budget
increases he thinks necessary to meet court-ordered standards”). Of course, identifying
problems and solving them are distinct activities.
159
Lewis, supra note 54, at D5 (reporting that Judge Ricardo M. Urbina once welcomed
new agency management by commenting that the city seemed “no longer ideologically
hostile” to the consent decree).
160
See, e.g., Joseph Tulman et al., Symposium, Reactions and Solutions, 3 D.C. L. REV.
425, 430–36 (1995) (reprinting remarks by acting YSA administrator Joyce Burrell, who
described her job as a “balancing act of deciding whether to rush [youth offenders] out [of
secure confinement] . . . or pay the fines” assessed for overcrowding).
161
ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 22.
162
The Supreme Court recently frowned on federally entered consent decrees that “bind
state and local officials to the policy preferences of their predecessors and may thereby
‘improperly deprive future officials of their designated legislative and executive powers.’”
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 449 (2009) (quoting Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441
(2004)). The District attempted to seize on Horne’s reasoning as grounds for terminating all
structural reform decrees against it in federal court; the district courts supervising those
consent decrees have uniformly found the argument unimpressive. See Salazar v. District of
Columbia, 729 F. Supp. 2d 257, 262 (D.D.C. 2010); Evans v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 126,
147–49 (D.D.C. 2010); LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 84, 115 (D.D.C.
2010); see also DeBonis, supra note 72 (spotlighting the sharp dispute between attorney
general Peter Nickles and the plaintiffs’ attorneys and judges involved, and showing that the
lawsuits have support among the District’s legislators). But the D.C. Circuit has reversed
one refusal to terminate, concluding that “[t]he district court’s Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry fell
short of what is required by Horne v. Flores.” Petties ex rel. Martin v. District of Columbia,
662 F.3d 564, 571 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
163
See Sandler & Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 117.
164
See Bradley S. Chilton & Susette M. Talarico, Politics and Constitutional
Interpretation in Prison Reform Litigation: The Case of Guthrie v. Evans, in COURTS,
CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 91, at 115, 124–25 (describing the
“generational effect” existing where one generation of institutional reform litigants designs a
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In the District, the senior managers who agreed to the consent decree’s
provisions appear not to have considered agency costs or any other
difficulties of implementation.165 Such blindness to the near future suggests
that the District’s managers166 wrongly believed that, by accepting the
consent decree, they could make the litigation go away.167 Alternatively,
the first-generation managers may rationally have recognized their ability to
personally depart for other jobs, leaving future generations to bear the costs
of implementing a poorly designed agreement.168
Even if the first-generation managers intend to live with the lawsuit,
there remains the question of whether they will subvert their own narrow
interests to the broader goals of the institutional reform lawsuit.169 The
annals of adult prison litigation include cautionary tales in which skillful
administrators exploit lawsuits not to reform but to entrench their
philosophies of corrections.170 This type of response shows that, in

remedy but their successors implement it, sometimes without remembering the purpose of
the decree’s provisions); see also Cripe, supra note 110, at 275 (referring to prison litigation
and lamenting that “[t]he sad fact is that the directors or commissioners who approved the
settlement often depart soon after, in the perpetual musical chairs operation which besets
most correction systems in this country”).
165
Responsibility for negotiating the decree appears to have belonged not to the head of
the Youth Services Administration, but to the parent agency’s head, the Commissioner of
Social Services. Compare Margaret Engel & Benjamin Weiser, Settlement Seen Near on
Juvenile Facilities, WASH. POST, July 2, 1986, at B1 (reporting a statement of Commissioner
Audrey Rowe on proposed settlement terms designed to protect youths from staff abuse:
“Management doesn’t condone that, so that isn’t a problem in [negotiating] the settlement”),
with Jerry M. Consent Decree, supra note 2, at 11 (“The defendants and their successors in
office and agents, employees or others who are providing services to or on behalf of YSA,
related to juveniles placed in YSA custody, shall comply with the terms of this Decree.”).
166
On the motivations of the mayor who agreed to the settlement, see infra text
accompanying notes 347–52.
167
See Margaret Engel, Report Cites D.C. Youth Agency ‘Chaos,’ WASH. POST, Dec. 18,
1986, at B1 (reporting the court monitor’s assessment that, six months after the consent
decree was signed, the system “remains in chaos,” but noting that the city “expended
substantial effort and made improvements in some areas” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
168
Compare Engel & Weiser, supra note 165, with USDA Biographies: Audrey Rowe,
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&
contentid=bios_rowe.xml (retrieved Feb. 4, 2011) (touting “a career of non-stop successes”)
(since the initial drafting of this article, the quoted material has been removed from the
webpage; a PDF of the earlier version is on file with the author).
169
See Sandler & Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 117 (stating that “agency officials . . .
often seek to use the lawsuit as a way to implement their own favorite ideas and to free
themselves from policy constraints and budget restrictions imposed by other officials”).
170
See Schlanger, supra note 89, at 562–63 (quoting one prison administrator who
explained: “we used ‘court orders’ and ‘consent decrees’ for leverage. We ranted and raved
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practice, one cannot count on institutional reform lawsuits to destabilize an
established order that reflects political blockage, as some theorists have
supposed.171
There is no doubting that the parade of ineffective managers and
overall failure to achieve compliance frustrated the Jerry M. court172 and
plaintiffs173 alike. This frustration led to harsh sanctions, such as contempt
findings and the imposition of fines for ongoing noncompliance.174 The
initial fines prompted the District to fire an administrator—but instead of
seeking a manager to achieve compliance, the mayor’s top advisors began
expressing second thoughts about the consent decree.175 Instead of
persuading the defiant defendant, the court’s attempt at coercion contributed
to the adversarial hostility that marked Jerry M.’s implementation phase.176
2. Organizational Changes
Some evidence suggests that the organizational structure of the
District’s agencies—primarily, the fact that the juvenile corrections agency
was, for a long time, a bureau buried within a much larger department—
contributed to the slow pace of change.177 However, the experience of other
states suggests that no one organizational structure is inherently more

for decades about getting federal judges ‘out of our business’; but we secretly smiled as we
requested greater and greater budgets to build facilities, hire staff, and upgrade equipment”).
171
See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1055–56, 1065–67. Recognizing that
institutional reform lawsuits often make available resources that the agency might not
otherwise obtain, Sabel and Simon suppose that these resources induce agencies to
participate in the crafting of a remedy. Id. at 1065–66.
172
See, e.g., Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr.
15, 2004) (Order VIII) at 21 (finding “a continuing pattern evident in previous enforcement
hearings, a lack of coherent planning at the highest levels, faulty implementation, and a
tendency to thrust hastily devised compliance policies upon mid-level and line staff”).
173
Churchville & Gellman, supra note 158, at D1 (quoting a plaintiffs’ attorney’s
assessment that “the defendants have a history and a pattern of changing the guard
periodically and that becomes an excuse to stall and delay”).
174
District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178, 190–92 (D.C. 1990) (upholding the
trial judge’s finding of contempt); Churchville & Gellman, supra note 158, at D1 (reporting
the imposition of fines of $100 per day per youth held in secure confinement in excess of
court-ordered population limits).
175
See Churchville & Gellman, supra note 158, at D1 (suggesting that the imposition of
fines was a proximate cause of an administrator’s firing, and attributing reservations to the
city administrator and corporation counsel).
176
Cf. Sturm, supra note 95, at 684 (noting that the executive’s initial receptiveness to an
institutional reform lawsuit can give way to hostility).
177
See DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 3.
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conducive to reform.178 Nonetheless, a major organizational shakeup can
invigorate a lethargic public agency.179
At the outset of Jerry M., the District’s youth corrections agency was
known as the Youth Services Administration (YSA).180 The administrator
of YSA reported to the commissioner of social services, who reported to a
director of the Department of Human Services (DHS), who reported to the
mayor.181 Thus, the YSA administrator had to fight for resources and
management autonomy against a host of higher-ups, who might secondguess the administrator or have other priorities for the department.182
Meanwhile, DHS suffered from its own chronic bouts of
mismanagement.183 The District’s inability to improve conditions in secure
facilities stemmed in part from “insufficient oversight by senior
management at DHS who may be too far removed from YSA’s day-to-day
operations and the youths being served.”184 Accordingly, the District’s
inspector general recommended that the mayor consider removing YSA
from DHS and making it a separate department with a director directly
accountable to the mayor.185

178
Compare MILLER, supra note 6, at 32 (stating that Massachusetts created its
Department of Youth Services after a series of youth abuse scandals rocked its Youth
Service Board; Jerome Miller, the department’s first head, embarked on the nation’s first
juvenile justice deinstitutionalization effort), with MENDEL, MISSOURI MODEL, supra note 9,
at 14 (noting that Missouri’s Division of Youth Services, the model youth corrections
agency, is part of the state’s larger Department of Social Services). See also John Kelly,
Stand-Alone Juvenile Justice Agencies Dwindling in Number, YOUTH TODAY (Jan. 22, 2011),
http://www.youthtoday.org/view_article.cfm?article_id=4584 (stating that sixteen states
currently have separate juvenile justice agencies and noting a recent trend towards merging
them with child welfare agencies or social services departments).
179
Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 451 (Alexander Hamilton) (B.F. Wright ed., 1961)
(“Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government . . . .
[A]nd a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad
government.”).
180
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1979, D.C. CODE div. I, tit. 1, ch. 15, subch. III, pt. A,
§ IV(C)(4) (LexisNexis 2001).
181
See, e.g., id. (showing YSA’s place in the bureaucracy); Jerry M. Consent Decree,
supra note 2, at 40–41 (stating that each of these officials is a Jerry M. defendant, in his
official capacity).
182
See Churchville & Gellman, supra note 158, at D1 (stating that the director of human
services sided with the commissioner of social services, who refused to support the YSA
administrator’s budget requests).
183
See, e.g., Michael Powell, Wasting Time, Space and Money: Business as Usual at
Human Services, WASH. POST, July 20, 1997, at A22.
184
ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 22.
185
Id. at 24.
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Though DHS disagreed with the recommendation, the city council
responded to mounting pressure from the courts and the public by adopting
it legislatively.186 The council hoped the altered management structure
would enable the cabinet-level agency to comply with the terms of the Jerry
M. decree.187 But the restyled organization remained unlikely to change
much, so long as it lacked effective management.188
3. Proactive Management, Compliance, and Far-Reaching Reform
The new agency, renamed the Department of Youth Rehabilitation
Services (DYRS), found a highly capable leader in Vincent N. Schiraldi, a
longtime reform advocate who had studied the District and brought with
him a reform-oriented senior management team.189 Schiraldi took the job
hoping “to improve decency and outcomes for a population of young people
who are nearly 100% youth of color.”190 Instead, because the department’s
operations were so profoundly broken, he quickly found his energy
consumed with basic operational questions such as determining who would
fix broken boilers that robbed secure facilities of heat and how to purchase
adequate supplies of underwear.191
Of course, Schiraldi had more ambitious plans, such as reducing the
overuse of secure confinement and implementing evidence-based
rehabilitation programs.192 By developing community-based alternatives to
secure confinement, DYRS reduced the average number of youths in locked
186

Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services Establishment Act of 2004, 52 D.C.
Reg. 2025, D.C. Law 15-335 (Apr. 12, 2005) (codified at D.C. CODE §§ 2-1515.01–21515.10 (LexisNexis 2001)); ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 24 (reprinting the DHS response
to the recommendation) (“The current leadership at DHS is capable of providing
management oversight necessary for YSA.”).
187
See D.C. COUNCIL COMM. ON HUMAN SERVS., REPORT ON BILL 15-1000, at 2, 9
(2004).
188
See ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 24 (“[G]iven a reasonable period of time, a highly
experienced manager with a background in juvenile justice who is accountable directly to the
Executive Office of the Mayor, can bring stability and focus to YSA operations, and put the
agency on the path to meeting all requirements of the Jerry M. Decree.”).
189
DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 5, 21 (mentioning that Schiraldi hired the new
agency’s deputy director, chief of staff, chief of committed services, and Oak Hill
superintendent). Schiraldi was not the District’s first choice for the position; for a discussion
of his appointment, see infra text accompanying note 359.
190
Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 2.
191
Id.
192
See Soler et al., supra note 83, at 525–26. Coauthor Marc Schindler was a key
member of Schiraldi’s management team and succeeded him as director of the agency. See
infra Part IV.G. For a description of DYRS’s reform agenda, including its rehabilitative
model and measurements of the agency’s success, see Soler et al., supra note 83, at 525–29.
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custody by nearly 40%, from 255 in 2005 to 154 in 2009.193 It is more
difficult to quantify how DYRS changed its culture to become more
rehabilitative, but the contrast from the culture of a traditional youth prison
is stark.194 For example, DYRS abandoned the use of solitary confinement,
which is central to the maintenance of order inside many youth correctional
facilities.195
Most concretely, the District constructed New Beginnings, a radically
different, sixty-bed secure facility that replaced the long-troubled Oak Hill
Youth Center.196 Describing the facilities at New Beginnings, Schiraldi
said:
It has beautiful windows and light, wood rafters, wooden doors, windows in the kids’
rooms that they can open themselves. It has almost three times as much programming
space as is required by national standards (including a 125 seat auditorium where the
kids regularly perform music and plays and have awards ceremonies), a terrific
gymnasium, a school with smart boards in every room, and a great shop class. These
words don’t come out of my mouth easily, but this is the nicest, most decent physical
197
plant of any correctional facility I’ve ever been in.

In response to pressure from the court and the council, the District had
budgeted over $34 million for the new facility shortly after Schiraldi’s
arrival.198 Yet without the right leadership, even this massive appropriation

193

See id. at 527.
See Wildeboer, supra note 71 (describing facilities and programming at New
Beginnings, and contrasting them to those of its predecessor, Oak Hill, and Illinois detention
centers).
195
Robert Wildeboer, Inside and Out: The Impact of Solitary Confinement in a Youth
Prison (WBEZ 91.5 FM broadcast May 12, 2010), available at http://www.wbez.org/
episode-segments/inside-and-out-impact-solitary-confinement-youth-prison#
(audio
recording), http://insideandout.chicagopublicradio.org/content/impact-solitary-confinementyouth-prison (written transcript) (quoting Schindler saying, “[y]ou can try and beat ‘em
down, which is what a lot of correctional approaches do, and try to punish them into good
behavior, but all the experience and the research shows . . . it just doesn’t work”); see also
MILLER, supra note 6, at 65, 99–100 (describing the “Tombs” in Massachusetts’s harshest
extended isolation facility, to which youths from other facilities could be transferred as a
punishment for bad behavior).
196
See Robert E. Pierre, Oak Hill Center Emptied and Its Baggage Left Behind, WASH.
POST, May 29, 2009, at B1 (quoting Schiraldi: “This is the anti-prison”).
197
Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 4; see also Hamil R. Harris, Blog, ‘New
Beginnings’ for Youthful Offenders, WASH. POST (May 29, 2009, 4:40 PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/dc/2009/05/new_beginnings_for_youthful_of.html
(posting a video of the facility).
198
See COUNCIL OF THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA, COMM. ON HUMAN SERVS., REPORT ON THE
FY 2006 BUDGET REQUEST 15–16 & n.6 (May 9, 2005) (noting that replacement of Oak Hill
had been urged by the Jerry M. plaintiffs, the 2001 report of the Mayor’s Blue Ribbon
Commission on Youth Safety and Juvenile Justice Reform, and Title XI of the Omnibus
194
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likely would not have resulted in reform. When Schiraldi arrived at DYRS,
the agency planned to replace Oak Hill with a prison four times larger than
New Beginnings,199 which “by virtue of its sheer size would have
encouraged an over-reliance on the use of secure incarceration . . . and
effectively prevented the city from making substantial investments towards
developing effective community-based programs, supports and services.”200
The small size of New Beginnings reflects a deliberate choice, informed by
research about the population of the District’s youth offenders,201 to resist
overconfinement by constraining the availability of confinement space.202
While it may be simple to suppose that building bigger facilities will
alleviate overcrowding and its attendant problems, facility expansion
presents a significant danger of replicating preexisting problems on a larger
scale.203 A federal court once ordered the District to construct an additional
300-bed facility to alleviate overcrowding at the Lorton Youth Center,
where the District confined those offenders aged eighteen to twenty-two
who were deemed promising candidates for rehabilitation.204 This order
Juvenile Justice Act of 2004, 52 D.C. Reg. 1188, D.C. Law 15-261 (effective Mar. 17, 2005)
(codified at D.C. CODE § 24-941 (LexisNexis 2001))).
199
See generally DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS. (D.C.), YOUTH SERVS. ADMIN., LITTLE RIVER
YOUTH CORRECTIONAL FACILITY (Oct. 31, 2003) (on file with the author) (stating program
requirements and proposing a site plan for a 240-bed secure facility, to be called “Little
River”).
200
Testimony of Vincent N. Schiraldi Before the D.C. Council Committee on Human
Services, Feb. 16, 2006, at 2 [hereinafter Schiraldi Testimony].
201
DEP’T OF YOUTH REHAB. SERVS. (D.C.), OAK HILL REPLACEMENT CAPACITY NEEDS
ANALYSIS (Feb. 20, 2006) (on file with the author) (citing an analysis conducted by the
Annie E. Casey Foundation concluding that a sixty-bed facility would be appropriate to
house the District’s most serious youth offenders, who would stay longer in secure custody
to protect public safety and provide adequate time for therapeutic rehabilitation); cf. Jerry M.
v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 1987) (Memorandum
Order A) at 19 (ordering the District to reduce the number of committed youths held in
secure confinement to sixty, in accordance with the Jerry M. panel’s recommendation).
202
Schiraldi Testimony, supra note 200, at 8 (mentioning plans to design a sixty-bed
facility to replace Oak Hill); see also Bart Lubow & Joseph B. Tulman, Introduction, The
Unnecessary Detention of Children in the District of Columbia, 3 D.C. L. REV. ix, xii (1995)
(“[I]f a community builds detention beds, the decision makers will fill those beds with
children. If a community refuses to maintain detention beds, community resources and
programs will work with children and produce better results.”).
203
See Schiraldi Testimony, supra note 200, at 2 (cautioning against an “edifice
complex” which supposes that all the problems of juvenile justice can be solved with newer,
larger facilities).
204
See U.S. v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973, 981–82 (D.D.C. 1971) (Gesell, J.)
(supplemental memorandum) (predating self-government in the District) (describing
elements of a plan developed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the mayor–commissioner
to create facilities for youth offenders, separated from the District’s adult prison in Lorton,
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sought to bring the facilities up to the standards imposed by “[t]he
Constitution, the [federal] Youth Corrections Act, and the conscience of a
civilized society.”205 But construction of a new Lorton Youth Center II did
not spur improvements in other fundamental aspects of rehabilitative
services.206
Though Schiraldi’s leadership proved extraordinary in many ways, it
would be a mistake to conclude that reform depended on Schiraldi’s
personal involvement. Schiraldi’s efforts to change the culture of the secure
facilities relied on extensive staff training and technical assistance from the
Missouri Youth Services Institute, a consulting firm founded by Mark
Steward to help other jurisdictions adopt the “Missouri model” of youth
corrections.207
During Schiraldi’s tenure, the District also began
participating in the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, an extensive
national effort of the Annie E. Casey Foundation that engages local judges,
prosecutors, defenders, juvenile corrections and probation agencies, and
other stakeholders to reduce the inappropriate incarceration of youths
awaiting trial.208 Though YSA sought the help of consultants before
Schiraldi’s arrival, the rudderless agency wasted the consultants’ advice.209

Virginia); see also HISTORICAL SOC’Y OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT, ORAL HISTORY PROJECT: HON.
GERHARD A. GESELL app.3 (1998), available at http://www.dcchs.org/GerhardAGesell/
gerhardagesell_complete.pdf (recounting Judge Gesell’s memory of ordering reluctant city
leaders to build a new facility).
205
Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. at 983.
206
See Ogletree, supra note 111, at 704–06 (citing United States v. Tillman, 374 F. Supp.
215 (D.D.C. 1974) and United States v. Norcome, 375 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1974)) (stating
that federal judges ordered later enhancements in the quality of diagnostic procedures
employed for entering youths).
207
Soler et al., supra note 83, at 525–27 (describing the District’s changes); Christine
Vestal, States Adopt Missouri Youth Justice Model, STATELINE (Mar. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.stateline.org/live/printable/story?contentId=288904 (profiling MYSI).
208
RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., TWO DECADES OF JDAI: FROM
DEMONSTRATION PROJECT TO NATIONAL STANDARD 2, 8 (2009) [hereinafter TWO DECADES
OF JDAI], available at www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/Initiatives/Juvenile%20Detention
%20Alternatives%20Initiative/TwoDecadesofJDAIFromDemonstrationProjecttoNat/JDAI_
National_final_10_07_09.pdf. For a comprehensive list of technical assistance and capacitybuilding services that philanthropies provided to DYRS, see LIZ RYAN & MARC SCHINDLER,
NOTORIOUS TO NOTABLE: THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF THE PHILANTHROPIC COMMUNITY IN
TRANSFORMING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 25–29 (2011),
available at
http://www.publicwelfare.org/Newsroom/Overview/11-12-01/Reforming_
Juvenile_Justice_in_DC.aspx.
209
See, e.g., ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 27–30 (listing the specific findings of a section
entitled, “YSA’s use of consultants has been largely ineffective and characterized by
unauthorized overspending, incomplete deliverables, unfulfilled objectives, and poor agency
oversight”).
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Finally, despite Schiraldi’s success in transforming the agency, some
observers have suggested the agency would benefit over the long term from
a director with a management style that made line staff feel more valued.210
In other words, reform becomes a realistic prospect when
administrators possess the desire and ability to implement a research-based
and cost-effective approach to youth corrections.211 Most importantly for
present purposes, a juvenile corrections agency with capable and committed
administrators can accomplish and sustain progress far more effectively
than a lawsuit can.212
B. LINE STAFF

A youth rehabilitation agency’s most important employees are its
front-line staff, who have great potential to influence youths—positively or
negatively—through their constant interactions.213 In the District, some
staff adopted Schiraldi’s philosophy of reform and served as a valuable
source of suggestions for improvement.214 However, the illustrations below
show that uncooperative staff members can undermine the implementation
of reforms in ways that mock both the control of agency management and
the efficacy of judicial intervention. Understanding and overcoming staff
210

See DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 27; Nikita Stewart, Juvenile Justice Chief in D.C.
is Leaving Post, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2009, at B4 (quoting D.C. Councilmember Tommy
Wells). Schiraldi’s blunt manner of speaking could upset the agency’s staff. E.g., Sue Anne
Pressley, The Evolution of Oak Hill, WASH. POST, April 9, 2006, at A1 (repeating Schiraldi’s
widely circulated remark that “I would not want to kennel my dog at Oak Hill,” which staff
understood as an insult).
211
See MENDEL, MISSOURI MODEL, supra note 9, at 5. “A new wave of reform is
gathering force, dual-powered by a growing recognition that the conventional practices
aren’t getting the job done, and by the accumulating evidence that far better results are
available through a fundamentally different approach.” Id.
212
Dale, supra note 10, at 733.
213
See MENDEL, MISSOURI MODEL, supra note 9, at 28 (stating that Missouri’s model of
secure facilities depends on “intensive supervision by highly motivated, highly trained staff
constantly interacting with youth to create an environment of trust and respect”); see also
Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to
Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 119, 161 (2012) (“[W]ithin
criminal justice systems most front-line staff are themselves significant power-holders.
Hence, the full study of power-holder legitimacy in the field of criminal justice necessarily
requires attention to be paid, not only to senior but also to junior power-holders and to the
interaction between them.”).
214
DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 18 (stating that school staff at the District’s New
Beginnings facility helped implement the agency’s new rehabilitative model through their
constructive interactions with youths and by showing unit staff, who were generally more
skeptical, that the model could succeed). For a report on DYRS staff attitudes to specific
reforms, as expressed in focus groups and interviews, see id. at 5–8, 17–26.
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resistance is critical to the success of a reform effort, whether it began on
the initiative of agency management or the court.215 Most particularly, this
Section shows why litigants and the court should not presume that detailed
court orders will receive automatic obedience, even if government leaders
use their utmost diligence.
In making changes at DYRS, Schiraldi and his management team “ran
into staff resistance at almost every step.”216
The predominantly
“correctional-minded” staff resisted a new rehabilitative model designed to
build on the strengths of youths and their families.217 Still, many of the
staff who opposed Schiraldi’s reforms resolved not to change and not to
leave, but to outlast his tenure—a reasonable option considering the churn
of leaders during the time of the Jerry M. consent decree.218
Before Schiraldi arrived and even before Jerry M. began, staff resisted
court-imposed reforms affecting the institutional culture. For example,
when a pre-Jerry M. court issued a disciplinary code to standardize
punishment for confined youths who displayed disobedience, staff routinely
disregarded the code and continued to punish youths as they pleased.219
Even when staff complied with the rules, they could do so in ways that
undermined the rules’ purpose of standardizing discipline.220 Because the
court cannot be present to enforce its order, telling line staff what to do lies
215

Id. at 27 (“The literature on best practices in implementing juvenile and criminal
justice programs shows that gaining acceptance from staff is extremely important,
particularly for reforms that involve a transformation of agency philosophy and institutional
culture.”).
216
Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 3.
217
Soler et al., supra note 83, at 526, 529.
218
See Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 1.
219
Weiser, supra note 79, at A1. For example, a 300-pound recreation counselor, who
found a youth with a bottle of liquor at football practice, promptly “slammed his forearm
into the boy’s chest and sent him sprawling.” Id. at A1, A18. He explained that the court’s
new rules were not his priority: “I deal with the problem first, rules second.” Id. at A1. And
he lamented the effect of court-imposed standards on the facility: “If we’d go back to some
of the things that we used to do in the old days we would be a better institution.” Id. at A18.
220
Id. In one case, a counselor accused six boys of plotting to escape and hiding a pair
of scissors. The counselor, who had pronounced the boys “dead meat,” reacted angrily when
a panel of other staff ordered only seven days in isolation for each offense. Told that seven
days was the code’s maximum punishment, the counselor urged ignoring the code “because
any appeal would come too late—the boys would have already served their sentences.” Id.
An on-site public defender exclaimed “You can’t do that!” so the counselor proposed that
the boys could remain “Right here” under his direct supervision for longer. Id. During her
turn to speak, the defender added, “I’ve heard that a few of the boys were visited [before the
hearing] by various counselors, who were choking them, slapping them around, threatening
them . . . .” Id. (alterations in original). The counselor began shouting at the defender, and
the panel adjourned after ordering the boys to isolation. Id.
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outside the court’s zone of competency—unless the court puts itself in the
position of management by imposing the extreme remedy of receivership.221
On one view, the effort to change a juvenile correctional facility is a
battle for control. For a very long time, an alarming number of staff
brought alcohol and drugs inside secure facilities and sold or gave them to
youths.222 Obviously this smuggling undermined whatever treatment efforts
were even attempted inside the facility, where “nearly 100% of . . . youths
suffer[ed] from substance abuse problems.”223 Staff may have enhanced
their control of a unit by distributing drugs to favored youths or keeping
them from disfavored youths.224 Alternatively, staff may have sold drugs to
youths simply to make money for themselves.225 Either way, it is clear that
some staff would readily sacrifice rehabilitative progress if it could help
them; in such circumstances management does not appear to have control.
Staff resistance can take other forms that do not harm youths directly.
Many staff, with apparent assistance from lower management, manipulated
221

See Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, 738 A.2d 1206, 1213 (D.C. 1999) (“The
appointment of a receiver to act in the place of ‘elected and appointed officials is an
extraordinary step warranted only by the most compelling circumstances.’ Essentially it is
the remedy of last resort, and therefore, should be undertaken only when absolutely
necessary.” (quoting Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1976))).
222
Some staff dealt drugs to confined youths in 1980, in 2004, and in between. See, e.g.,
In re An Inquiry Into Allegations of Misconduct Against Juveniles Detained at and
Committed at Cedar Knoll Inst., 430 A.2d 1087, 1089 (D.C. 1981) (noting that Family Court
Judge Gladys Kessler found evidence of a drug trade between staff dealers and youth
customers); ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 30 (“[Oak Hill] employees and substance abuse
treatment counselors stated that Youth Correctional Officers (YCOs) are a primary source of
the illegal substances used by youths.”); Benjamin Weiser, Delinquents, Staff Linked in
Deals, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1985, at A1 [hereinafter Delinquents] (describing “an
institution that has almost given up trying to combat the drug problem, . . . where a few
counselors allegedly use and deal in drugs themselves”).
223
ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 30–31 (stating that many youths who were drug-free
upon entering Oak Hill later tested positive for marijuana and PCP after a period of
confinement). But cf. Jeffrey A. Butts, Blog, How Prevalent Are Substance Abuse and
Mental Heatlth Issues in Juvenile Justice? The Answer May Surprise You (Feb. 16, 2011),
http://blog.reclaimingfutures.org/?q=node/1461 (citing Gail Wasserman et al., Psychiatric
Disorder, Comorbidity, and Suicidal Behavior in Juvenile Justice Youth, 37 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 1361 (2011)) (interpreting a study of a large sample of youths involved at various
levels with the juvenile justice system as showing that repeat offenders and youths in secure
confinement are much more likely to have substance abuse or mental health issues than firsttime or lower-level juvenile offenders).
224
In 1985, one youth at Oak Hill explained that a staff member supplied him with
drugs, which the youth sold inside the institution. Weiser, Delinquents, supra note 222, at
A14. The youth’s money “won him a special standing with his own counselor” because the
youth was able to “lend[] his counselor money as a way of gaining immunity.” Id.
225
Id. (quoting one head counselor: “There’s a lot of profiteers [among the staff]”).
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work schedules and timecards to supplement their regular pay with large
helpings of overtime.226 Overtime abuse can become pervasive when there
is widespread absenteeism or when lower management is allowed to grant
overtime to favored staff. Overspending on overtime puts chronic pressure
on the department’s budget, consuming funds intended for other uses,
including the development of alternatives to placing delinquent youths in
secure detention.227 While overtime abuse might not harm youths as
directly as other staff actions can, it is an important and readily quantifiable
sign that middle management is neither susceptible to control of senior
management nor disposed to act properly outside of close supervision.228
A much more visible and damaging form of staff sabotage consisted of
recurring staff-aided escapes.229 By passively declining to intervene to stop
an escape in progress230 or sometimes assisting more actively, staff can
express displeasure by disrupting the institutional order.231 Explaining why
one escape occurred, an unnamed source told a reporter: “Many of the old
staff are angry that overtime has been cut back significantly, and there is a
feeling that they may be letting the kids go and looking the other way in an
attempt to make the place look like it’s falling apart.”232
Escapes are damaging because, unlike nearly every other type of
occurrence at a secure facility, they receive extensive media attention. This
attention reflects poorly not on the staff, but on reformers (whether agency

226

See, e.g., ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 101–03 (investigating the agency in the year
before Schiraldi’s arrival). Line staff routinely disregarded a timecard policy requiring them
to sign in and out upon arriving at and departing from work. Id. at 101. Andersen’s report
noted with understatement that “[f]ailure to adhere to this policy creates a potential for [time
and attendance] fraud.” Id. Another agency policy limited each employee to 24 hours of
overtime in a two-week pay period, but line staff were observed “consistently exceeding the
24-hour limit by averaging 30–60 overtime hours per pay period.” Id. at 102.
227
See White et al., supra note 50, at 416 (expressing the frustration of Donna Wulkan,
co-counsel to the Jerry M. plaintiffs, that the institutions relied heavily on overtime while
lacking resources needed to hire more staff).
228
Engel, supra note 157, at A1 (quoting Mayor Marion Barry making this point).
229
See also MILLER, supra note 6, at 98–103 (describing administrative and political
responses to staff-aided escapes from Massachusetts reform schools).
230
E.g., Sari Horwitz & Elsa Walsh, Escape of 12 Teen Offenders Probed, WASH. POST,
Feb. 19, 1987, at C6 (quoting a department director saying, “I have some questions about
how alert the staff on the bus was at the time” that three youths escaped through a window).
231
Cf. Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1077–80 (discussing litigation’s “stakeholder
effects” and illustrating examples in which the emerging stakeholders act in ways that
advance the lawsuit’s goals).
232
Elsa Walsh, Four More Youths Flee From Oak Hill Facility, WASH. POST, Sept. 27,
1986, at B3. But cf. id. (quoting a named staff member who discounted the theory of staff
assistance and said the youths involved “just want to go home”).
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managers or a court) who have destabilized the institutional order.233
Actors who destabilize a system are obvious objects of opposition from
other actors whose stability is threatened.234 Seen from this perspective,
escapes are an effective means of destroying reformers’ credibility and
undermining their political support. In one especially embarrassing
episode, a youth escaped from New Beginnings one day after a ribboncutting ceremony at which Mayor Adrian Fenty called it “one of the best
rehabilitative facilities in the country.”235 Determining exactly which
employees were responsible is typically difficult and time-consuming,
especially compared to the immediacy of negative coverage.236 And it may
be impossible to determine whether a particular escape was caused by staff
sabotage, or by overcrowding and staffing shortages—both of which are
well beyond staff control.
These anecdotes suggest that some line staff have a perceived interest
in undermining changes without regard to whether management or a court
ordered them.237 But it cannot be forgotten that there are also staff
members who embrace new approaches and offer valuable ideas about
improvement.238 One evaluation of the DYRS reforms found that, while
“many staff were supportive of the new therapeutic model, and many were
opposed to it, [interviews and focus groups] also revealed a large majority
who fell somewhere in between the two extremes.”239 Developing
233
See Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1062 (conceiving of public law litigation as a
means of enforcing a right to destabilize a public institution controlled by entrenched
interests); see also id. at 1064–65 (mentioning the influence of regulatory capture theory on
the theory of public law litigation).
234
See, e.g., White et al., supra note 50, at 412 (recognizing “the issue of the city
employees whose jobs would be in jeopardy because, in a sense, the [deinstitutionalization]
plan is establishing private nonprofit organizations,” and proposing that existing staff be
retrained to work in community-based alternatives).
235
Darryl Fears, Inmate Escapes New Jail for Youths, WASH. POST, June 1, 2009, at B1.
236
E.g., Paul Duggan, D.C. Punishes Youth Center Employees for Escapes, WASH. POST,
July 10, 2009, at B1 (reporting, five weeks after an escape, that the department fired five
staff and disciplined three supervisors for their actions, which the mayor described only
vaguely as constituting a failure to “do everything they could have and should have done to
prevent these escapes”). Though the employees’ union representative had no comment on
the firings, she derided the new facility as “Camp Cupcake.” Id.
237
See MILLER, supra note 6, at 98 (“Staff-stimulated incidents are not meant to
demonstrate the uncommon incorrigibility, violence, or character of the staff but of the
inmates—inmates clearly in need of stricter regimens.”).
238
See, e.g., Chico Harlan, Leap of Faith, WASH. POST MAG., Oct. 21, 2007, at W12
(profiling an Oak Hill recreation counselor who requested and received permission to take
eight committed youths on a camping and rafting trip to the Grand Canyon as a reward for
their good behavior).
239
DALY ET. AL, supra note 47, at 22–23.
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constructive relationships with line staff is essential to implementing a
reform effort seeking to remake an institution’s culture.240 And, most
importantly for present purposes, courts cannot assume that staff members
do only what they are told.241
In this light, one must question whether highly detailed orders make a
constructive contribution to the creative task of building a new,
rehabilitative juvenile corrections agency.242 In Jerry M., the need to
measure compliance with the consent decree imposed administrative
burdens that distracted from staff’s work with youths.243 More importantly,
mandating a level of performance measured by detailed standards may be
appropriate when the agency is holding itself to the wrong standards. But
when the problem is that a chaotic institution casually inflicts intolerable
suffering on the youths it is supposed to protect, imposing higher or more
specific standards for conduct is more likely to compound the failure than
to spur reform.244 This compound failure can itself become an obstacle to
reform; in Schiraldi’s view, “the law suit and judicial oversight served to
contribute to an atmosphere of profound learned-helplessness, with staff

240

See AMANDA B. CISSNER & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION,
AVOIDING FAILURES OF IMPLEMENTATION 6 (June 2009), available at
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/FailureFinal.pdf
(discussing
approaches to gaining line staff’s acceptance of correctional reforms); see also, e.g., DALY
ET AL., supra note 47, at 27 (noting agency management’s periodic efforts to engage DYRS
staff).
241
See Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 7 (“[T]he legal system and the courts
believe that if something is simply ordered, it must be done, which is completely the
opposite of my experience with large government bureaucracies.”).
242
E.g., Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 15,
2004) (Order VIII) at 9 (finding the District in contempt for failure to show, inter alia,
compliance with a consent decree provision requiring the District “to assure that the assigned
Treatment Team takes primary responsibility for developing the [youth’s Individual Service
Plan], assisted by diagnostic staff,” apparently because the diagnostic staff members
assumed too much of this responsibility); see also SILVERSTEIN, supra note 113, at 15
(proposing a framework for evaluating the relative risks and rewards of establishing public
policy goals through “juridification”).
243
E.g., ANDERSEN, supra note 58, at 82 (stating case managers’ view that unrealistic
deadlines for assessments and treatment plan reviews required them to be “‘paper
processors’ rather than clinicians,” and recommending negotiations with the plaintiffs to
amend these requirements); cf. Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward Rubin, Prison Litigation and
Bureaucratic Development, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 125, 145 (1992) (arguing that a strong
bureaucracy protects inmate rights).
244
See Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 3–4 (“Staff themselves had become
institutionalized and numb to the impact of the daily indignities foisted upon the young
people by day-to-day exposure to such inhumane conditions.”).
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fully believing that there was nothing that could be done to pull the
department out of its downward spiral.”245
Though line staff may not be high enough on the organizational chart
to be named defendants,246 a court can take constructive actions aimed at
promoting reform through improvements in the line staff. A court might
order the agency to adopt higher training or educational requirements on the
workforce247 or, somewhat more drastically, suspend civil service job
security protections to the extent they interfere with the constitutional rights
of incarcerated youths. Even changes to seemingly unrelated processes
(such as the authorization of overtime hours) can have the effect of
disrupting the status quo so that a new workplace culture can take hold. On
the other hand, a court may justifiably believe that these kinds of changes
are best left to the executive and legislative branches.248
C. JUDGES

In other institutional reform litigation contexts, there may be some
reason to consider “the court”—meaning the individual judge presiding
over the class action—as the only relevant personification of judicial
power.249 But Jerry M. presents a very different context, in which a family
division judge manages a consent decree governing correctional facilities
while other family division judges continuously order delinquent youths to
the same facilities.250 Occasional appeals from orders of the Jerry M. trial
245

Id. at 8.
The Jerry M. defendants are the D.C. Government (including, in their official
capacities, seven individuals from the Mayor to the superintendents of the District’s three
secure facilities and their successors in office) and the D.C. Public Schools (including, in
their official capacities, the superintendent and head of special education). Jerry M. Consent
Decree, supra note 2, at 40–41.
247
See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 81, at 6 (urging federal funding
for incentives designed to attract college-educated workers into juvenile justice systems, and
noting the presence of such incentives in child welfare).
248
See DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 27–30 (recommending that DYRS management
develop and maintain strong relationships with line staff, further enhance staff training, and
integrate school staff and therapists into other activities).
249
See, e.g., SILVERSTEIN, supra note 113, at 15 (considering “the courts” as an
alternative to the traditional political process).
250
Although the Jerry M. plaintiffs raised constitutional claims, they filed their
complaint in D.C. Superior Court rather than federal court. See text accompanying supra
notes 16–22. Given the history of judicial interventions described in this Section, the
plaintiffs likely believed that local judges would be receptive to the complaint. The local
forum also avoids problems that might have arisen after the federal Prison Litigation Reform
Act or the Supreme Court’s decision in Horne. See text accompanying supra notes 118–20
& 162.
246
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judge involved yet another set of judges from the D.C. Court of Appeals.
Even the phrase “Jerry M. trial judge” means the three different judges who
at some point presided over Jerry M. during its twenty-six years and
counting.251 This “plurality” of judges—i.e., the reality that multiple judges
influence the same public policy at the same time—complicates juvenile
conditions litigation, especially when different judges have different visions
of the juvenile justice system’s purpose.252
As a consequence, there exists a potential for great tension between
judges and reform. Two potential sources of conflict stand out. First,
family court judges have equitable powers that allow them to affect broader
policies of juvenile justice through the disposition of a single delinquency
case. However, the principles of equity provide no clear rules to channel
the judges’ powers to do justice by acting “in the best interests of the
child.”253 When a judge’s equitable order interferes with another judge’s
order, the conflict can deprive judicial action of coherence. Second, in
practice a consent decree as detailed as the one in Jerry M. operates as a
contract, the terms of which differ from the government’s duties under any
relevant statutes and the Constitution.254 Even at times when the District,
under Schiraldi’s leadership, adopted a reform agenda that transcended the
decree’s requirements, the Jerry M. court only concerned itself with the
District’s obligations under the consent decree.255 Far from preserving
equity’s essential flexibility, formalistic insistence on compliance with the
decree can become self-defeating.256
Putting Jerry M. aside momentarily, it is helpful to set out the extent,
and the limits, of the power D.C.’s family court judges have. In the
251

See White et al., supra note 50, at 411 (noting that the first judge, Ricardo M. Urbina,
accepted an appointment to the federal bench and was succeeded by Judge Richard A.
Levie). Currently, Judge Herbert B. Dixon presides over the case. See, e.g., Jerry M. v.
District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 13, 2004).
252
See ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 66, at 7 (“[M]en, not Man, live on earth
and inhabit the world. While all aspects of the human condition are somehow related to
politics, this plurality is specifically the condition—not only the conditio sine qua non, but
the conditio per quam—of all political life.”).
253
D.C. CODE § 16-2320(c) (LexisNexis 2001) (authorizing the judge to choose among
various remedial dispositions after a child has been adjudicated delinquent or in need of
supervision). For the Jerry M. judge’s views of this issue, see infra note 259.
254
See Sandler & Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 117, 122.
255
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 286.
256
See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (“The essence of equity
jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to
the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The
qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and
reconciliation between the public interest and private needs . . . .”).
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District, the court orders a youth who is detained awaiting trial to a
placement, whether a secure facility or a community-based alternative.257
After adjudicating a youth delinquent, the court places the youth in the
custody of DYRS and loses all control over his subsequent placement; the
agency has discretion to make the most appropriate available placement.258
Further, in delinquency and abuse or neglect proceedings, family division
judges often face dilemmas in evaluating a child’s needs and ordering
appropriate relief, especially when the judges lack experience in the subject
matter and when they do not trust the social workers and probation officers
to ascertain or act in the best interests of children.259
Upon its filing, the Jerry M. case was assigned to Hon. Ricardo
Urbina, the presiding judge of the family division in D.C. Superior Court.
Judge Urbina was also the coauthor of a contemporaneously published
manual for new juvenile court judges; this manual provides some insight
into Judge Urbina’s views—including his belief that a judge new to the
family division docket would feel that legal training and professional
experience had been poor preparation for the job.260 The manual begins
with a hypothetical case:
“Michael” is a 13 year old who has been in foster care since age 6 when his mother’s
boyfriend abused him. Michael is before the court for disposition of his first
offense—he pled guilty to setting fire in his foster home. He has been returned to his
mother several times, but a second abusive boyfriend and her subsequent eviction and
transient life among friends and homeless shelters have resulted in his removal.
Michael is bright but frequently fights in school. He is described by his worker as
being “sad, lonely, and fearful with a hot temper.” The defense attorney says Michael
wants to live with his mother, and recommends closing the delinquency case. The
prosecutor feels that Michael is dangerous and unpredictable and wants him
committed as a delinquent, although he is too young for the juvenile institution. The
neglect worker wants him out of that system because she can’t handle a “criminally-

257

See D.C. CODE § 16-2310.
See In re P.S., 821 A.2d 905, 907 (D.C. 2003) (holding that the court lacks statutory
authority to direct the treatment and placement of a delinquent youth who has been
committed to the agency’s custody).
259
See MARGARET BEYER & RICARDO URBINA, AN EMERGING JUDICIAL ROLE IN FAMILY
COURT 1–2 (1986). Coauthor Beyer was one of three experts on a panel created by the Jerry
M. consent decree to design a continuum of care needed to reduce the number of youths held
in secure confinement. See District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178, 179 n.1, 181
(D.C. 1990).
260
See BEYER & URBINA, supra note 259, at 39 (“Judges wanting to keep within the
mainstream of judicial thinking find that common law, statutes, and caselaw provide
insufficient guidance about the limits of their mandate to protect the best interest of the
child.”).
258
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inclined adolescent.” The probation officer thinks Michael is emotionally disturbed
261
and recommends special placement.

What is the judge to do?262 The extent of the judge’s involvement in
an individual child’s case is often a matter of judicial discretion and
philosophy, with the typical judge becoming more involved when the
workers appear less competent.263 In the course of ordering and supervising
the government’s provision of services in the best interests of the child, a
judge can self-consciously drive policy changes in service provision
overall.264 Thus, experience in the family division can prime a judge for
ordering dramatic interventions aimed at broad change.265
Indeed, the history of judicial intervention to improve conditions of
secure confinement for the District’s incarcerated youths is much older than
Jerry M., and this history reveals a desire among some judges to drive
systemic changes.266 The most far-reaching intervention began after a day
in which four separate juveniles alleged in Judge Gladys Kessler’s
courtroom that they had been victims of serious mistreatment during their
confinement at Cedar Knoll.267 Acting on her “plain duty to discover what
261
Id. at 1–2; see also Emily Buss, Failing Juvenile Courts, and What Lawyers and
Judges Can Do About It, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 318 (2011) (decrying the absence of a
meaningful role for the child in hearings like this one).
262
In at least one respect, this is a simple case because the youth is both culpable and in
need of services. See Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding
Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 284, 293 (2007) (arguing that
juveniles’ advocates are more likely than those of adults to be ineffective, “juvenile court
culture frowns upon zealous advocacy,” and juvenile defendants are more likely to plead
guilty without understanding the meaning or consequences of a plea). Delinquency is
sometimes used as a tactic to secure services that are otherwise unavailable. See ANNIE E.
CASEY FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 81, at 5 (“Juvenile courts and corrections systems
have become a dumping ground for youth with mental health problems, abuse and neglect
histories, and learning disabilities who should be served by public systems with specialized
expertise in addressing these problems.”); BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON YOUTH SAFETY &
JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN D.C., FINAL REPORT 20 (Nov. 6, 2001) [hereinafter BLUE
RIBBON COMM’N], available at https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/oakhill/documentsand-resources/blue-ribbon-commission/ (referring to “[t]he apparent excessive use of
commitment as a strategy to secure services”).
263
See BEYER & URBINA, supra note 259, at 3, 30.
264
See id. at 30 (illustrating how judges can “include making systemic changes part of
their role” by issuing careful directives to social workers and probation officers).
265
For a sample of remedial orders issued in Jerry M., see supra text accompanying
notes 50–57.
266
See, e.g., United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973, 979, 982–83 (D.D.C. 1971)
(requiring the construction of an additional facility for incarceration of young adults up to
age twenty-two, in order to alleviate overcrowding and provide for rehabilitation).
267
In re An Inquiry Into Allegations of Misconduct Against Juveniles Detained at and
Committed at Cedar Knoll Inst., 430 A.2d 1087, 1088–89 (D.C. 1981). The four juveniles
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is happening to the children” and declaring that the allegations described a
“horror . . . almost beyond belief,” Judge Kessler convened six fact-finding
hearings over a seven-month period.268 At the end of the inquiry, Judge
Kessler issued “a comprehensive order mandating sweeping changes” at the
secure facilities.269 The District appealed the order, arguing that the trial
court exceeded its authority and that the evidence from the hearings did not
warrant the order.270 Mindful of separation of powers concerns and noting
that the District had since released the four youths from its custody, the
D.C. Court of Appeals vacated Judge Kessler’s order for want of
jurisdiction.271
While Jerry M. was underway 1994, another judge intervened on
behalf of youths held for overnight stays at the Receiving Home for
Children pending their initial appearances.272 Following seven youths’
claims that they were given little or no food during a weekend stay, Judge
George W. Mitchell made a personal, unannounced visit to the Receiving
Home.273 City lawyers believed they had successfully rebutted the youths’
allegation, but Judge Mitchell found the conditions “unacceptable for a
civilized country.”274 He ordered its nearly immediate closure, giving the
District one week to provide for the custody of arrested youths on nights
and weekends.275 But Judge Mitchell was not acting in a closed universe.

“recounted incidents of physical abuse and sexual assaults by counselors; physical attacks
and beatings by other juveniles which are allowed to occur because of inadequate
supervision; drug abuse by both students and counselors and distribution of narcotics to
students by counselors; administration of prescription drugs by untrained personnel; and,
instances where juveniles who were clearly in need of medical attention were denied access
to treatment by counselors.” Id. at 1089.
268
Id. at 1089 (quoting trial court order of Sept. 26, 1977). Without certifying a class of
plaintiffs, Judge Kessler appointed the Public Defender Service to represent all juveniles
confined in the facility for the inquiry’s purposes. Id. at 1088, 1089.
269
Id. at 1088.
270
Id. at 1090.
271
Id. at 1090–92; see also id. at 1094 (Ferren, J., dissenting) (“In calling this case moot,
my colleagues would force the trial court into the untenable position of either having to place
a child in an inhumane facility while ordering the conditions improved, or of removing the
child and allowing the conditions that forced the removal to go uncorrected.”).
272
E.g., Lubow & Tulman, supra note 202, at xx.
273
Nancy Lewis, D.C. Judge Orders Shutdown of Children’s Receiving Home, WASH.
POST, Aug. 18, 1995, at B1. At the time, Judge Mitchell was the head of the Family
Division. Id.
274
Id.
275
Judge Mitchell required that a replacement facility include “‘[a] place for the children
to eat other than in their hands and with their fingers’ and a ‘place where the food can be
placed other than the floor.’” Id. (quoting Judge Mitchell’s order). “‘This place, where you
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With the Receiving Home shuttered, the District kept children at Oak Hill
pending initial appearance; as a result, Oak Hill’s daily population swelled
above the limit ordered in Jerry M., and the District incurred more fines for
contempt.276
At other times, judges advanced policies in direct conflict with key
Jerry M. goals. For example, the Jerry M. lawsuit is partly an effort to end
the District’s unnecessary overconfinement of youths who did not warrant
secure placements.277 Yet as DYRS sharply reduced the duration of secure
confinement for lower-level offenders, some judges balked; they brought
their views in private to city councilmembers, who interrogated Schiraldi
about the new policy at a public hearing.278 Additionally, although the
Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) sought judges’
participation in establishing standards defining the limited cases in which
secure detention is appropriate,279 individual judges were apparently able to
disregard the standards.280 To be fair, the judges expressed concern that the
continuum of less restrictive, community-based placements “was not fully
implemented as designed and . . . as a result, youth in the community were
not getting the needed range of services.”281 But despite the availability of
forums such as JDAI, tension between the two groups was a significant
obstacle to successful implementation of new initiatives.282 Judges and
DYRS management reported that “they often had different views about how
to best serve youth, . . . the types of youth that are most in need of secure
placement, and the adequacy of the placement options.”283
are keeping these children, is appalling and is unfit to house animals of a lower level,’
Mitchell said, his voice rising with revival fervor.” Id.
276
See RYAN & SCHINDLER, supra note 208, at 17.
277
Jerry M. Complaint, supra note 18, at 51–52; see supra text accompanying notes 23–
27.
278
See Pierre, supra note 153, at B1 (describing how Schiraldi “was summoned before
the council’s Committee on Human Services to answer questions raised, mostly in private,
by judges, prosecutors and community groups about whether his agency was releasing
youths too soon”).
279
See MENDEL, TWO DECADES OF JDAI, supra note 208, at 26.
280
See DEP’T OF YOUTH REHAB. SERVS. (D.C.), supra note 201, at 2 (“The number of
commitments in 2005 vastly exceeded the 2004 total of 144, even though there was a
decrease in the number of juvenile arrests. The increase appears largely to have resulted
from the high levels of commitments by one judge sitting for the first time on juvenile cases
in the past year and a half.”).
281
DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 19.
282
Id. at 21 (stating that trust eroded after the city council enacted a law, which DYRS
did not seek, and that judges resented because it limited their authority to order specific types
of placements).
283
Id. at 20.
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For the sake of argument, I assume that the judges’ dim view of the
DYRS community-based alternatives is accurate.284 But why? Although
Schiraldi never offered Jerry M. as an excuse, he did characterize it as a
major distraction.285 After noting that one of his first acts as director was to
pay a massive sum of overdue contempt fines, Schiraldi said:
[F]rankly, if I could have paid $3.6 million and the lawyers and the monitor would
have just gone away and allowed me to set my own priorities, it would have been a
bargain. The lawsuit forced me to focus more on the minutia of improving conditions
over deinstitutionalization and the creation of a workable network of community
programs. The litigants, none of whom were managers, never understood that in a
system that deep in a hole, it was impossible to prioritize all fronts simultaneously.
Given choices, they would consistently prioritize what they knew best and where the
law provided the most readily available remedies—conditions issues—despite the fact
that most of them admitted that the institution-based system was itself inherently
flawed and that the remedy most needed was watershed change and
286
deinstitutionalization, not a new coat of paint on a failed, institutional model.

Of course, such a statement must be considered in light of the long
experience of the lawsuit. Once the Jerry M. judge observed that orders
and threats of even worse punishment were the only tools that seemed to
have any effect, it would be natural to respond with increasingly specific
orders.287 And some of the Jerry M. requirements—most prominently, the
straightforward mandate to close Cedar Knoll by December 1, 1987—
afforded the District a great deal of flexibility, which it failed to use
advantageously.288 Perhaps the best approach for the court presiding over
an institutional reform lawsuit is to be decisive and general on what must be
achieved, while remaining flexible on how it will happen.289

284

See Colbert I. King, Op-Ed, Released, Yes. Rehabilitated, Not So Much., WASH. POST,
Oct. 25, 2008, at A15 (charging that under Schiraldi, DYRS prematurely released offenders
who had not been rehabilitated and then inadequately supervised them in the community).
King, whose frequent columns on juvenile justice often expressed the views shared by some
judges, also believed DYRS badly erred in limiting the size of New Beginnings to sixty
beds. See id.
285
See Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 6.
286
Id.
287
See Dixon v. Barry, 967 F. Supp. 535, 551 (D.D.C. 1997) (structural reform litigation
involving the District’s mental health system) (“[T]he repeated failure of the District to
comply with the court’s orders eliminates any basis for judicial restraint when remedying
noncompliance.”); Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 19, at 1823–24 (discussing Jerry M.).
288
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
289
See DiIulio, What Judges Can Do, supra note 91, at 308 (describing the approach of
Judge Lasker to a prison lawsuit in New York City).

2012]

JUVENILE CORRECTIONS REFORM

947

D. MEDIA

Of course, the press is not charged with implementing juvenile justice
reform.290 But public perceptions of the juvenile justice system (and
politicians’ beliefs about these perceptions) frame the ways in which
politicians act towards the juvenile justice system.291 These political
attitudes remain vitally important even when an institution is involved in a
lawsuit.
Through the news media, an institutional reform lawsuit brings public
attention to the conditions that are the basis of the suit.292 Potentially, this
attention gives institutional reform plaintiffs a second path to success: even
if the lawsuit does not reform the system directly, the litigation can succeed
by generating news coverage that prods political leaders to pursue reform
on their own.293 As one public defender put it, a conditions lawsuit and indepth investigative reporting bring public attention to “the horrible things
we do to children incarcerated at facilities with pleasant-sounding names
such as ‘Cedar Knoll’ on ‘Jolly Acres Road’ and the ‘Oak Hill Youth

290
But see NEUSTADT, supra note 139, at 28–29 (positing that, because executive power
is a matter of persuasion rather than command, “[m]any public purposes can only be
achieved by voluntary acts of private institutions; the press, for one . . . , is a ‘fourth branch
of government’”) (citing DOUGLAS CATER, THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (1959)).
291
BARRY KRISBERG ET AL., NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, YOUTH
VIOLENCE MYTHS AND REALITIES: A TALE OF THREE CITIES 12–13 (Feb. 2009), available at
http://www.aecf.org/~/media/PublicationFiles/Casey Youth ReportFinES.pdf (finding that in
the District, “newspapers highlighted crime increases and often call for a quick response
from city leaders,” who responded with emergency legislation imposing a 10 p.m. youth
curfew, giving police access to confidential juvenile records, and denying bail for certain
alleged offenses); see also Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 75, at 642–43 (summarizing the
1980s and 1990s trend toward sensationalizing crimes committed by remorseless juvenile
superpredators and the effect of this reporting on nationwide adoption of laws facilitating the
prosecution of youth offenders in adult criminal courts). Tanenhaus and Drizin charge that
the mainstream media has perpetuated a myth that juvenile courts were never designed for
serious violent crime. See id. at 644. Their review of recently rediscovered records of
11,000 homicides in Chicago between 1870 and 1930 shows that early juvenile courts
adjudicated murder cases. See id. at 648–49 (citing HOMICIDE IN CHICAGO 1870–1930,
http://homicide.northwestern.edu/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012)).
292
See Sturm, supra note 95, at 670 (“Litigation has also generated considerable media
coverage of prison conditions. Virtually every case study reports extensive media coverage
of the litigation and the conditions and practices in the targeted institutions.” (citations
omitted)).
293
See id. (stating that, in the adult prison context, news coverage of litigation “is widely
credited with increasing public awareness of the inadequacies in correctional institutions and
acceptance of the need for reform”).
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Center.’”294 Yet the public attention may come to focus on issues other
than those most important to the lawsuit. Further, there are no guarantees
that media coverage will remain favorable to reformers as they implement a
decree, especially if doing so entails politically controversial action.
Since the beginning of Jerry M., there has been no shortage of stories
informing the public of the problems in the District’s juvenile justice
agency.295 But once that story has been told, it is no longer novel; reporters
searching for scoops must either dig deeper or look elsewhere. Updates on
the litigation’s progress can certainly be newsworthy; however, after the
parties have agreed to a consent decree, coverage of litigation is likely
confined to implementation failures, not successes.296 Later news coverage
of the District’s agency shifted focus to assessing the lawsuit’s impact on
city hall politics.297 At one point, Jerry M. was a story of improper
government contracting;298 at another, of a judge’s dramatic request for a
meeting with the mayor.299 While valuable as news reporting, stories on
such side issues are unlikely to spur politicians to embark on ambitious
institutional reforms. Such stories also divert attention from the persistence
of intolerable conditions in facilities and the merits of deinstitutionalization.
Further, negative media coverage can quickly undercut political
support for reform.300 In the District, media coverage of escapes, whether
294

Diane Shust, Op-Ed, They Call It ‘Juvenile Justice,’ WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1986, at

C8.
295
After plaintiffs filed the original complaint and before the parties agreed to the
consent decree, the Washington Post ran a two-part, front-page series of thoroughly reported
stories. See Weiser, Delinquents, supra note 222; Weiser, Youth Facility Policy, supra note
79.
296
The news reports cited throughout this Comment support this point. For a rare story
on a positive development in the litigation, see Henri Cauvin, Blog, Improved Juvenile Ward
Education:
D.C.
Report,
WASH.
POST
(Jul.
8,
2010,
2:20
PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/crime-scene/post/improved-juvenile-ward-educationdc-report/2010/12/20/ABFPCDG_blog.html (“In a new report filed today, the monitor
overseeing a court-ordered reform of the District’s juvenile justice agency said the city had
has [sic] staged a ‘remarkable’ turnaround in how it educates juveniles in long-term
detention.”).
297
See, e.g., Sandra Evans, City Hall Notebook: Budget Bodes Ill for Unfortunates in
City Institutions, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1986, at DC1 (noting the folly of a budget proposal
that defunded all operations at Cedar Knoll—which the city had committed to close—and
failed to create any alternatives).
298
E.g., Benjamin Weiser, Youth Contracts Kept Despite Allegations, WASH. POST, June
27, 1986, at B1.
299
E.g., Lewis, supra note 57.
300
Schiraldi, Remarks, supra note 65, at 5 (“The press became a serious problem over
time. Although we got uniformly terrific press initially, and some members of the media
like the Post’s editorial board and the Kojo Nnamdi show were consistently supportive
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staff-aided or not, repeatedly undermined confidence in agency
management.301 So did coverage of sensational crimes involving youths
who had been at one time or another in DYRS custody.302 Part IV.G tells a
story in which relentless media criticism influenced a political decision to
replace reform-minded agency management.
When reformers are in the position of agency management, they face a
twofold public relations problem. First, so long as they remain subject to
the control of the political branches, they cannot afford to lose public
support or allow public attitudes favoring incarceration to overwhelm those
receptive to rehabilitation.303 Second, reformers can expect negative news
coverage of their failures, but juvenile confidentiality laws may constrain
the agency’s ability to respond effectively to bad-news stories.304
In summary, an agency can earn positive news coverage of its
successes outside the corrections lawsuit, but such stories by their nature
will appear with less frequency.305 Plaintiffs in juvenile justice litigation
should not expect media coverage over the long run to favor reform over
institutionalization.

throughout my tenure, all you have to do is ‘google’ my name to get a sense of some of the
negative press I received during my time at DYRS, coverage which colors the ‘verdict’ on
the reforms to this day.”).
301
E.g., Colbert I. King, Op-Ed, A Grieving Mother Left in the Dark, WASH. POST, June
26, 2010, at A15 (decrying the department’s supervision of youths in community-based
placements); Elsa Walsh, Crawford Sharply Criticizes Youth Facilities, WASH. POST, Sept.
25, 1987, at C1 (reporting that a key legislator “sharply criticized” management in response
to a report that 25% of youths escaped secure confinement at Oak Hill).
302
E.g., King, supra note 301, at A15 (reporting that a murder victim’s mother said,
“DYRS ‘is a breeding ground for vile offenders to freely walk away and commit some of the
most unspeakable crimes imaginable.’”).
303
See KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 291, at iv-v (finding complexity in public opinion
toward youth rehabilitation and observing that media coverage has a large influence on
attitudes toward youth offenders).
304
E.g., Editorial, Secrecy Run Amok, WASH. POST, June 22, 2010, at A18 (referring to a
murder case in which “Maryland authorities released arrest records of the three suspects
charged . . . while D.C. officials were constrained in even acknowledging the youths were
under the supervision of youth rehabilitation services”); see also Drizin & Luloff, supra note
262, at 309 (arguing that the absence of media observers from juvenile proceedings
contributes to an incorrect public perception that “the juvenile court is a place where children
are not punished and [are] allowed to commit crimes without any repercussions”).
305
Harlan, supra note 238 (profiling a group of DYRS youths during an eight-day
wilderness trip, and noting that the newspaper agreed not to publish information about the
youths’ offenses).
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E. THE LEGISLATURE

In an influential article on the politics of criminal law, the late
Professor Stuntz distinguished “surface politics,” which lead legislatures to
react to the ebb and flow of public opinion, from “deep politics,” in which
legislatures cooperate and compete with other governmental institutions.306
Stuntz argued that only deep politics—specifically, an institutional alliance
of legislators and prosecutors that appellate courts cannot resist—truly
explains the continuous expansion of the criminal law since the midnineteenth century.307
Stuntz recognized only two major exceptions to criminal law’s
expansion: the repeal of Prohibition and the criminal code revisions
inspired by the Model Penal Code.308 But we should rank the advent of
juvenile justice as a third exception. Ever since legislatures created the first
juvenile courts, juvenile justice has stood uncomfortably alongside criminal
law.309 The states’ juvenile court acts substantially narrowed criminal law’s
scope when they insulated children from the cruelty of criminal punishment
for their criminal acts. It is no accident that an entire species of modern
tough-on-crime legislation—the transfer laws embodying the sound bite
“adult time for adult crimes”—consists of expanding criminal law’s scope
by eroding juvenile court jurisdiction.310 The political “accident” is that
criminal law reformers (including some crucially important trial judges,
running with the parens patriae doctrine) created juvenile justice systems in
the first place.311
Quibbles aside, Stuntz’s analysis remains penetrating. His distinction
between surface politics and deep politics guides the following discussion.

306
See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 509–10 (2001).
307
Id. at 525, 528.
308
Id. at 525 n.93.
309
See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 75, at 645–49; see also Scott R. Hechinger,
Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Antidote to Congress’s One-Way Criminal Law Ratchet?,
35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 408, 444–64 (2011) (arguing that, in the current political
climate, it is possible for congressional action to spur an important reform of youth-crime
policy).
310
See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 75, at 664–66.
311
See Gwen Hoerr McNamee, The Origin of the Cook County Juvenile Court, in A
NOBLE SOCIAL EXPERIMENT? THE FIRST 100 YEARS OF THE COOK COUNTY JUVENILE COURT,
1899–1999, at 14, 18 (Gwen Hoerr McNamee ed., 1999); Hammer, supra note 87, at 928–
30.
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1. Surface Politics
Public opinion about youth crime is complex. In one poll, 91% of
American voters agreed that youth crime “is a major problem in our
communities,” and barely one-third felt the juvenile justice system was
effective in getting youths to stop committing violent or nonviolent
crimes.312 Taken alone, these answers might suggest that getting tougher on
youth crime would be popular with the public. But 89% agreed that
“[r]ehabilitative services and treatment for incarcerated youth can help
prevent future crimes.”313 And when asked which policy responses are
“highly effective” ways to reduce youth crime, voters favored rehabilitative
approaches over tougher punishment.314 Thus, the public appears to believe
both that a serious youth-crime problem exists and that the best response
entails far more than reflexive punishment.
Media portrayals can have as much effect on public perception of
youth crime as actual youth-crime trends do.315 In the District, youth crime
received extensive media coverage beginning in 2003, when a series of
high-profile crimes involved a wave of “kiddie car thieves” and fatal
shootings by teens of innocent bystanders, including other teens.316 Despite
these high-profile crimes, the District’s youth-crime rate was dramatically
lower in 2003 than it had been in the mid-1990s.317

312

BARRY KRISBERG & SUSAN MARCHIONNA, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME &
DELINQUENCY, ATTITUDES OF US VOTERS TOWARD YOUTH CRIME AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
2–3 (2007), available at http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/zogby_feb07.pdf. Zogby
International conducted this telephone poll of 1,043 randomly selected voters using validated
weighting and sampling procedures. The margin of error was +/– 3.1 percentage points. Id.
at 2.
313
Id. at 3.
314
Id. at 6. The approaches are as follows (with the share rating them “highly effective”
in parentheses): increasing education and job skills training for youths in the juvenile justice
system (75%); increasing prevention services for youths in the community before they get in
trouble (71%); increasing counseling and substance abuse treatment through the juvenile
justice system (54%); harsher penalties for offenders under age 18 (33%); and prosecuting
more youths in the adult criminal justice system (26%).
315
See KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 291, at 2–3.
316
RYAN & SCHINDLER, supra note 208, at 10; Sewell Chan, Shooting Highlights Crime
Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2003, at C1.
317
JEFFREY A. BUTTS, URBAN INSTIT., JUVENILE CRIME IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 3 & tbl.1
(Dec. 2003), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/310910_JuvenileCrimeDC.pdf
(reporting that overall juvenile arrests increased in the District from 2002 to 2003, but the
2003 arrest figures still represented a 38% decrease in overall juvenile arrests since 1995).
Butts’s report appeared in December 2003 as a reply to punitive policy responses to the
youth-crime issue. See id. at 1–2. Examining data from 1995 to 2007 (with the benefit of
hindsight), Krisberg found that the juvenile arrest rate for violent offenses had peaked at 529
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But the initial legislative responses acted on the news, not the data.318
Councilmembers proposed legislation to get tough on youth crime, for
example by punishing parents of delinquent children.319 Most prominently,
Mayor Anthony Williams introduced an omnibus juvenile justice act.320
The mayor’s proposal incorporated a few of the reforms recommended in
2001 by his Blue Ribbon Commission on Youth Safety and Juvenile Justice
Reform, but the bill also contained expansive provisions to make
prosecuting youths in criminal court easier and to get tough on youth
offenders and their parents.321 The mayor’s proposal received strong
support from prosecutors, including both the District’s corporation counsel
and the United States Attorney’s Office.322

per 100,000 youths in 1996, bottomed out at 218 in 2002, and then rose before appearing to
level off at 399 in 2007. KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 291, at 28–29.
318
Cf. Paul H. Robinson et al., The Modern Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes:
An Empirical Study of Offense Grading, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 709, 735 (2010)
(arguing that the cumulative effect of legislative reactions to “some upsetting crime in the
news” deprives criminal codes of coherence and rationality). Or, as another observer has put
it, “there are far more bills introduced in every legislative session that need to die than need
to pass.” ASHWORTH, supra note 5, at 3; see id. at 2–5 (explaining the dynamics of “bad ol’
bills” and the combination of benefits and low costs for legislators who sponsor them).
319
E.g., Juvenile Justice and Parental Accountability Amendment Act of 2003, B. 15460, §§ 2, 6 (introduced by Councilmember Chavous) (proposing, inter alia, to impose a
mandatory fine on the parent of a delinquent child and to authorize the mayor to suspend the
parent’s driver’s license depending on the severity of the offense or number of
adjudications); see also Juvenile Justice Act of 2003, B. 15-574 (introduced by
Councilmember Mendelson) (proposing procedural changes that would have the effect of
transferring more youths to the criminal system).
320
Omnibus Juvenile Justice, Victim’s Rights and Parental Participation Act of 2003, B.
15-537 (introduced at the mayor’s request).
321
Id.
In a scaled-back form, the mayor’s bill adopted the commission’s
recommendations to add a purpose clause to the Juvenile Court Act; release “children in
need of supervision” (i.e., truants and runaways) instead of incarcerating them; evaluate the
effect of rehabilitative services on delinquent youths; and create individualized treatment
plans for each delinquent youth. Id. at tit. I, IX–XI. The mayor’s bill also proposed to allow
prosecutors to share confidential information about juveniles; facilitate the transfer of
juveniles accused of violent offenses to the criminal system; restrict judges’ ability to
dismiss delinquency cases when the child is not in need of rehabilitation; create a new
juvenile offense for failing to appear at a delinquency hearing; grant victims the right to
participate in a delinquency hearing; authorize courts to order delinquent juveniles or their
parents to pay restitution; and require parents to participate in their children’s rehabilitation
plans, under pain of contempt. Id. at tit. III–IV, VI–VIII, XII; see also Letter from Anthony
A. Williams, Mayor, D.C. to Linda W. Cropp, Chairman, Council of D.C. (Oct. 31, 2003)
(accompanying the bill and explaining its rationale).
322
COUNCIL OF D.C., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL 15-527, “OMNIBUS
JUVENILE JUSTICE AMENDMENT ACT OF 2004,” at 25–29, 31–34 (2004) [hereinafter “REPORT
ON BILL 15-527”] (summarizing testimony from prosecutors). In the District, the U.S.
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But the punitive legislation was opposed by a coalition of youth
advocates who had successfully organized themselves earlier to influence
the commission.323 Now the coalition turned to getting the council to pay
attention to the commission’s report.324
The commission’s
recommendations—including its most concrete proposal, the closure of Oak
Hill—purposefully aligned with Jerry M.’s goal of transitioning to smaller,
safer facilities designed for rehabilitation rather than warehousing.325 At the
coalition’s urging, Councilmember Adrian Fenty introduced a bill based
closely on the commission’s recommendations.326
In the end, the commission’s recommendations were a major influence
on the bill that came out of committee.327 Having set out to get tough in
response to growing fears about youth crime, the council adopted a more
balanced omnibus bill that required replacing the crumbling Oak Hill
facility with a new, rehabilitation-oriented model.328
Again, Stuntz was right to describe surface politics as an “ebb and
flow.”329 The confluence of political factors that produced this legislative
act was bound to change.330 As Jerome Miller might have put it: Even if

Attorney prosecutes all crimes except misdemeanors; the District’s corporation counsel
(since renamed the District’s attorney general) brings delinquency petitions.
323
The Justice for D.C. Youth Coalition consisted of national advocacy groups,
including the Youth Law Center and the Justice Policy Institute, as well as local service
organizations such as the Latin American Youth Center and the Alliance of Concerned Men.
RYAN & SCHINDLER, supra note 208, at 10.
324
One councilmember, apparently unaware of the Blue Ribbon Commission and its
2001 report, introduced a bill “[t]o establish a Juvenile Justice Task Force for the purpose of
recommending improvements in the District of Columbia’s criminal justice system as it
applies to juveniles.” See Juvenile Justice Task Force Establishment Act of 2003, B. 15-573
(introduced by Councilmember Brazil).
325
See BLUE RIBBON COMM’N, supra note 262, at 14–15 (framing the commission’s
recommendation to close Oak Hill as “a new rallying cry” to satisfy the city’s obligations
under the Jerry M. consent decree).
326
Blue Ribbon Juvenile Justice and Youth Rehabilitation Act of 2004, B. 15-673
(introduced by Councilmember Fenty); see RYAN & SCHINDLER, supra note 208, at 10–11.
327
RYAN & SCHINDLER, supra note 208, at 22. Councilmember Kathy Patterson, chair of
the council’s judiciary committee, made significant changes to the omnibus bill that
tempered its punitive aspects and incorporated more of the commission’s report. See
REPORT ON BILL 15-527, supra note 322, at 9.
328
See Omnibus Juvenile Justice Act of 2004, 52 D.C. Reg. 1188, D.C. Law 15-261
(effective Mar. 17, 2005) (codified at D.C. CODE § 24-941 (LexisNexis 2001)); REPORT ON
BILL 15-527, supra note 322, at 16–21.
329
Stuntz, supra note 306, at 510.
330
For one, the union representing Oak Hill’s correctional staff had no involvement in
this debate. Later, the union would make its position on reforms clearly known. E.g., Elissa
Silverman, Brown Wins Endorsement of Union for Youth Jailers, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2006,
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surface politics can allow reform to begin, they will also ensure that
sustained support for reform “will not be based on results, but will be a
matter of chance, of happenstance, of politics and mood.”331
2. Deep Politics
In the surface-politics story of legislative responses to public opinion,
Jerry M. had a quiet presence largely confined to the background. But from
the perspective of deep politics, the lawsuit’s existence alters the power
balance among the institutions of government. This rebalancing does not
flow from the court’s orders, and its effect is noticeable even when the court
does not order the legislature to take action.
The most obvious illustration of this effect is the legislature’s common
and well-documented tendency to increase the budget of the target agency
in an institutional reform lawsuit.332 The District’s city council needed only
a cursory reference to Jerry M. to approve budget increases for the youth
corrections agency.333 But what accounts for the legislature’s usual
readiness to reward troubled agencies with additional resources?
Because its members are publicly accountable, a legislature seeks to
avoid blame.334 Conveniently, a legislature cannot be blamed for
institutional reform litigation arising from faulty execution of the law. But
when it appears that inadequate funding is a cause of the agency’s
compliance problems, the legislature becomes exposed to a risk of blame.

at B4 (reporting that the union representing line staff at Oak Hill endorsed Michael A.
Brown in his campaign for mayor “because he supports its calls for the dismissal of
department Director Vincent Schiraldi”).
331
MILLER, supra note 6, at 226.
332
See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 89, at 562–63. With so many D.C. human services
agencies operating under some form of court supervision, a leading local policy advocate
counted the existence of a reform lawsuit as the first factor to consider when analyzing their
proposed budgets. See Susie Cambria, An Objective Tool to Assess the Mayor’s Budget and
the Council’s Changes, SUSIE’S BUDGET & POL’Y CORNER (Jan. 19, 2011),
http://susiecambria.blogspot.com/2011/01/objective-tool-to-assess-mayors-budget.html.
333
See, e.g., Fiscal Year 2005 Operating Cash Reserve Allocation Emergency Act of
2005, 52 D.C. Reg. 3162 (Apr. 1, 2005) (authorizing DYRS to spend, in addition to its
approved annual budget, nearly $3.3 million “to cover increased costs of court ordered
requirements”). This supplemental funding increased DYRS’s $51.7 million budget by
about 6.4%. Cf. GOV’T OF D.C., 2 FY 2005 PROPOSED BUDGET AND FINANCIAL P LAN E-7
(June 21, 2004), available at http://cfo.dc.gov/cfo/LIB/cfo/budget/2005/pdf/pbfp05_e_
hss.pdf (using the term “Youth and Adolescent program” to refer to DYRS).
334
See, e.g., SILVERSTEIN, supra note 113, at 3, 28–29 (illustrating policy approaches in
other contexts that insulate legislative bodies from blame).
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In that case, the legislature will typically perceive eliminating the risk of
blame as worth the cost of giving the agency additional funding.335
As a practical matter, the court’s involvement constrains the
legislature’s allocation of fiscal resources.336 The lawsuit’s constraint is
akin to the constraints imposed by federal mandates, voter-imposed tax and
expenditure limits, or economic down-cycles.337 The legislature can
perceive the constraint’s existence whenever the agency says its funding is
inadequate to comply with the decree—whether or not the court has gone so
far as to specifically order additional appropriations.
Likewise, the Jerry M. court had not ordered the District to close Oak
Hill when the council enacted its statutory mandate to do so; the idea came
from the 2001 report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Youth Safety and
Juvenile Justice Reform.338 But the participation of the commission’s
chairman, Judge Eugene Hamilton, gave the report an unmistakable judicial
imprimatur.339 Two years later, when surface politics prompted the council
to do something about the youth-crime problem, the council stood exposed
to blame if it ignored the commission’s recommendations. The council’s
statutory mandate and the judiciary’s perceived support for it left Mayor
Williams with little room to maneuver; his next budget funded a $34.2
million capital project to replace Oak Hill.340
However, in this deep politics story, the court’s support for reform
means more to the legislature and the executive than it does to the public.
Early in Jerry M.’s history, it was clear that deinstitutionalization plans
335

When the additional funding would cause or exacerbate a fiscal crisis (i.e., any
moment of acute resource scarcity requiring a reordering of major policy priorities), the cost
becomes prohibitive and the legislature may not be moved to act. Thus, the court’s
involvement in Jerry M. had little budgetary impact during the District’s period of fiscal
insolvency from roughly 1993 to 2000; the city lacked both the money to fund priorities and
the management capacity to order priorities.
336
From the perspective of the legislature as a funding decisionmaker, this is a “firstorder” constraint because the decision has been taken out of the legislature’s hands and
treated as a given. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 19–21 (1978)
(differentiating between first- and second-order changes).
337
See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SOUND
STATE BUDGETING PRACTICES, at ch. 2 (1995), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/budget-tax/fundamentals-of-sound-state-budgeting-practices.aspx#constrain.
338
See supra text accompanying notes 319–28.
339
Judge Hamilton was the chief judge of the D.C. Superior Court from 1993 until
assuming senior status in 2000 after thirty years on the bench. Emily Langer & Keith L.
Alexander, Obituary, Judge Sat Atop D.C. Superior Court Bench, WASH. POST, Nov. 21,
2011, at B6.
340
COUNCIL OF D.C., COMM. ON HUMAN SERVS., supra note 198, at 15–16 & n.6; DALY
ET AL., supra note 47, at 2 (referring to Oak Hill’s closure in May 2009).
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would face a major obstacle: NIMBY opposition from residents opposed to
establishing group homes and other community-based alternatives to
confinement in their neighborhoods, coupled with an absence of sparsely
populated areas in such a compact city.341 In an op-ed published in the
Washington Post, three court-appointed experts sought to persuade the
city’s residents to accept group homes and troubled youths in their
neighborhoods; so far as one can tell, their argument had absolutely no
effect on public opinion.342 Like any other political actor, the court’s
influence has potential and limits.
F. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

The difficulties agency managers face in obtaining reliable information
about operations or issuing orders and having them executed are
compounded at the chief executive level.343 As a practical matter, a chief
executive’s role in juvenile corrections litigation is limited to only a few
actions: selecting and supporting the director of the youth corrections
agency.344

341
See, e.g., Virginia Mansfield, Barry Says More Group Homes Will Open Throughout
the City, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1985, at DC1 (describing hostility in many neighborhoods to
community-based placement of delinquent youths, prisoners, foster children, and people
with mental illness or developmental disabilities). I embrace Lydia DePillis’s descriptive
(rather than pejorative) use of the label:

NIMBY: Not In My Back Yard. As in, “I don’t object to this [homeless shelter/windmill/trash
transfer station/Walmart/meth clinic] in principle, but I’d rather not have to deal with it in my
neighborhood.” That definition holds true even for the people who would add, “because my
neighborhood is already a dumping ground for that kind of crap” or “it’s just not the right place
for that kind of thing.”

Lydia DePillis, What I Talk About When I Talk About NIMBYism, WASH. CITY PAPER (Aug.
2, 2011, 6:29 PM), http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/housingcomplex/2011/08/
02/what-i-talk-about-when-i-talk-about-nimbyism/ (brackets in original).
342
See Marty Beyer, Robert E. Brown & Paul DeMuro, Op-Ed, How to Help
Delinquents Help Themselves, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1987, at D8. The three coauthors were
the members of the Jerry M. panel; see text accompanying supra note 27.
343
See, e.g., NEUSTADT, supra note 139, at 34–35 (describing the institutional
antagonism between a president and cabinet members, who respond to different
constituencies).
344
Id. at 7–8 (conceiving of the presidential role as that of a mere clerk, who labors to
administer formalities (such as signing bills or executive orders) on behalf of the subordinate
departments that actually perform work). On the distinction between labor and work, see
ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 66, at 7, 144–152.
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Depending on the circumstances, a chief executive might either
welcome or resist an institutional reform lawsuit.345 Newly elected
executives are especially likely to embrace a lawsuit because doing so tends
not to reflect poorly on their own administration’s record.346 But even an
incumbent executive can find cooperating with the lawsuit advantageous.
In 1986, with Mayor Marion Barry facing a genuine challenge for a
third term in office, one might have expected some hostility towards the
Jerry M. plaintiffs from an administration keen to avoid negative news
coverage of another lawsuit.347 Instead, Mayor Barry was generally
receptive to negotiating with plaintiffs.348 The election provided an extra
reason for him to negotiate a consent decree quickly, because a lengthy trial
on juvenile corrections conditions would only “keep[] public attention
focused on the problems of the city during the campaign season.”349 By
1989, when the Jerry M. court began fining the District for its
contemptuous failure to comply with the decree, Barry felt free to openly
deny the lawsuit’s legitimacy.350 Especially to the extent that these events
destroyed the District’s credibility with the court, the conduct of the firstgeneration chief executive, like that of the first-generation administrators,351

345
See Sabel & Simon, supra note 93, at 1062–63 (mentioning instances where elected
executives, including D.C. Mayor Anthony Williams, conceded the deficiencies of public
institutions and welcomed litigation as a means of correcting problems).
346
Id. at 1063.
347
At the time, many of the District’s public care systems operated under court
oversight. See Toni Locy, In D.C., It’s Often Government by Decree, WASH. POST, Oct. 3,
1994, at A1 (stating that Barry’s successor, Mayor Sharon Pratt (née Kelly), was
confrontational and uncooperative towards institutional reform lawsuits generally).
348
See id. (quoting Peter Nickles, whose work at the time included representation of
plaintiffs in separate reform suits involving mental health and prison systems, assessing
Barry’s involvement). But cf. id. (stating that judges in the suits “have blamed the former
mayor [Barry] for the deterioration of some city agencies, which hindered compliance with
the decrees”).
349
Engel & Weiser, supra note 165, at B1. Barry went on to win reelection to a third
four-year term, which was a disaster. See HARRY S. JAFFE & TOM SHERWOOD, DREAM CITY:
RACE, POWER, AND THE DECLINE OF WASHINGTON, D.C. 176–199, 230–268 (1994)
(chronicling Barry’s out-of-control drug use during the 1986 campaign and his inattention to
governing, culminating in his famous arrest in January 1989).
350
Victoria Churchville, D.C. Youth Service Chief Quits, WASH. POST, June 8, 1989, at
C1 (“We must not allow court orders to continue to supplant our own initiatives. What we
must do is use creative management strategies to make youth services more cost-effective,
more efficient and more accountable.” (quoting a written statement issued by Barry)).
351
Cf. supra Part IV.A.1 (profiling the District’s first-generation administrators).
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retains an outsized influence over the enduring lawsuit as it shifts to the
implementation phase.352
Much later, Mayor Williams created his Blue Ribbon Commission on
Youth Safety and Juvenile Justice Reform.353 Mayor Williams’s action
aligned with his broader effort to reclaim the vast powers the District had
lost to institutional reform lawsuits.354 The commission took a broad view
of its mandate and boldly recommended the closure of Oak Hill.355 At least
initially, the administration appeared to have more interest in ending the
lawsuit than in extensive juvenile justice reform.356 Still, the commission’s
recommendations retained an independent vitality; politically, the mayor
could hardly oppose the city council’s later effort to enact the commission’s
recommendations into law.357
As far as juvenile corrections litigation is concerned, the single most
productive action a chief executive can take is the appointment of a capable
agency director who will embrace and implement reform. So it is worth
noting that the District only reluctantly hired Schiraldi; it first offered the
352

One might also conclude that the government’s interest in managing long-term risks
(such as the possibility that court supervision beginning in 1986 could continue through
2011 and beyond) is similar to its interest in caring for incarcerated youths, in that neither
interest has an electorally important constituency.
353
Williams created the commission at the urging of prominent Washington lawyer
Charles F.C. Ruff, who had served as the District’s corporation counsel in the mid-1990s.
RYAN & SCHINDLER, supra note 208, at 8, 10.
354
“Williams (D) has made the return of city agencies from judicial supervision to full
local control a top goal of his administration.” Sewell Chan, Study Panel Backs Closing of
Oak Hill, WASH. POST, July 25, 2001, at B1 (disclosing that the Blue Ribbon Commission
appointed by Mayor Williams would recommend closing Oak Hill, and quoting a deputy
mayor’s tentative statement that the administration “is open to all recommendations from the
commission”).
355
The Annie E. Casey Foundation funded the commission’s paid staff. RYAN &
SCHINDLER, supra note 208, at 19–20. The commission’s chair, Eugene N. Hamilton, was a
former Chief Judge of the D.C. Superior Court; he described the commission’s purpose as
follows:
The vested interest in the existing system is one of the most substantial obstacles to change and
improvement . . . . We’re out looking for the best solutions for the children of the District of
Columbia, a system that treats them in the most humane fashion during the time they’re in the
juvenile justice system and which is most preventive on the front end and most rehabilitative on
the back end.

Chan, supra note 354, at B1–B4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
356
See D.C. AFFAIRS SECTION OF THE D.C. BAR, STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE BLUE
RIBBON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND YOUTH REHABILITATION ACT OF 2004 (Mar. 17, 2004),
available
at
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/sections/district_of_columbia_affairs/
statements/juvenile.cfm (“Nearly three years have elapsed and virtually none of the
Commission’s recommendations have been adopted.”).
357
See DALY ET AL., supra note 47, at 4–5.
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job to three other candidates who were unlikely to attempt the reforms
Schiraldi envisioned.358 Finally, it must be remembered that the executive
actions that most promoted reform are also examples in which events
differed substantially from the executive’s apparent intentions. By
implication, the chief executive’s control of the government is far more
tenuous than theorists of institutional reform litigation commonly suppose.
G. EPILOGUE

This Comment’s consideration of juvenile correctional reform in the
District of Columbia has focused almost exclusively on conditions that led
to the lawsuit and efforts to reform the system between 2005 and 2009.
Both the judiciary and actors within the political branches are capable of
advancing reform—but not without difficulty. However, the political
branches are more likely than a court to second-guess their own support for
reform. To underscore that point, this epilogue outlines the turbulent events
of 2010, a year in which the agency’s leadership disintegrated.
At the beginning of 2010, Schiraldi left DYRS to accept a job as
director of prisons and probation in New York City.359 Schiraldi was
succeeded by his top aide, Marc Schindler, and the special arbiter
commended the agency for a smooth leadership transition that sustained
and in some respects improved the agency’s performance.360 But Schindler
was appointed director on an interim basis, without being nominated for

358

See Michael Bochenek & Marc Schindler, Op-Ed, Wrong Man for the Job, WASH.
POST, Oct. 26, 2003, at B8 (criticizing District officials who made Lamont Flanagan their top
candidate, in light of his eleven-year record as director of the Baltimore City Jail); see also
Theola Labbé, Behind Oak Hill’s Fences, Violence and Uncertainty, WASH. POST, Aug. 2,
2004, at B1 (reporting the city administrator’s statement that the District had sought
unsuccessfully to lure Leonard Dixon from the juvenile detention center in Wayne County,
Michigan). According to Marc Schindler, Jasper Ormond of the District’s probation agency
was also offered the job but declined.
Notably, a committee selected reformer Jerome Miller to lead the Massachusetts youth
corrections agency, defying the governor’s wishes. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 34
(“Governor Sargent bluntly told me I wasn’t his first choice.”).
359
E.g., Editorial, A D.C. Reformer Departs, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2009, at A26 (noting
that Schiraldi “was both hailed and vilified for his emphasis on rehabilitating, rather than
confining, juveniles convicted of crimes” and recognizing that the agency had made both
“dramatic improvements” and “serious missteps”).
360
The Special Arbiter’s Report to the Court Regarding Defendants’ Progress Toward
Meeting Certain Requirements of the Revised Final Approved Amended Comprehensive
Work Plan at 3, Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 8,
2010).
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council confirmation.361 Although Mayor Fenty “showed enormous resolve
in backing Mr. Schiraldi,” Schindler’s interim status foreshadowed an
erosion of political support for the agency’s rehabilitative approach to youth
corrections.362
By the summer of 2010, the agency endured a storm of media criticism
rivaling the exposures of the agency’s abuses in the 1980s. First, a tragic
and brazen shooting, which killed three teenagers and injured six others,
was initially linked to a teenager in DYRS custody who had run away from
a community-based group home.363 Though it was later proven that the
teenager had no involvement in the shooting, media coverage of the
incident severely damaged the agency’s reputation.364 Later, three eighteenyear-old youths under DYRS supervision were charged with murdering the
popular principal of a D.C. public school.365 Finally, Washington Post
columnist Colbert King demanded in frequent opinion pieces that DYRS
stop coddling young offenders and return to a tougher approach.366
Despite the headlines, youth advocates, academics, and counsel to the
Jerry M. plaintiffs each urged Fenty to nominate Schindler to lead the
agency on an ongoing basis.367 But Peter Nickles, the District’s attorney
general and a longtime Fenty confidant, soured on DYRS management and
its perceived laxity toward youths, according to a memo he wrote that was
highly critical of the agency.368
361
Mayor’s Order 2010-23, Appointment: Interim Director, Department of Youth
Rehabilitation Services, 57 D.C. Reg. 1275 (Feb. 5, 2010).
362
Editorial, A D.C. Reformer Departs, supra note 359, at A26.
363
The news media published extensive coverage of the shooting, including the
Washington Post’s two-part, front-page series. See Paul Duggan, Nine Days: The Story
Behind the Southeast Shootings, WASH. POST, June 3, 2010, at A1; Paul Duggan, Steely
Determination, Deadly Retaliation, WASH. POST, June 4, 2010, at A1.
364
See, e.g., Henri Cauvin, Fenty Picks New Chief of Juvenile Justice, WASH. POST, July
20, 2010, at B1.
365
Editorial, A Shrouded Justice System: Betts Murder Raises Questions About How
D.C., Courts Handle Young Offenders, WASH. POST, May 7, 2010, at A26.
366
See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 153 & 284.
367
See, e.g., Cauvin, supra note 364, at B1 (referring to Schindler’s supporters outside
the administration); Testimony of Peter Edelman before the D.C. Council, Committee on
Human Services, June 14, 2010 (on file with the author); Letter from Alan A. Pemberton,
attorney, Covington & Burling, LLP to Adrian Fenty, Mayor, D.C. (June 22, 2010) (on file
with the author) (“On behalf of Plaintiffs’ counsel in the Jerry M. case, I write to urge you to
appoint Marc Schindler as the permanent director of DYRS. He has our unequivocal
support.”).
368
See PETER J. NICKLES, MEMORANDUM TO HON. ADRIAN M. FENTY, MAYOR, REVIEW OF
DYRS RECORDS REGARDING COMMITTED YOUTH ARRESTED FOR MURDER OR ASSAULT WITH
INTENT TO MURDER IN 2009–2010, at 6 (May 20, 2010) available at
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/debonis/dyrs_report_oag.pdf (examining fewer than two
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Finally, Fenty fired Schindler and replaced him with Robert Hildum, a
prosecutor who believed that New Beginnings was much too small and that
more youths should be confined in locked custody.369 Two of DYRS’s top
managers immediately resigned.370
The abrupt firing of Schindler occurred at a time when Fenty’s
campaign for reelection sputtered.371 There is circumstantial evidence that
Fenty’s campaign strategy to win the Washington Post’s support influenced
his decision to fire Schindler. As the election grew closer, Fenty’s electoral
hopes increasingly relied on receiving overwhelming support from white
and affluent neighborhoods, where the Washington Post’s endorsement is
believed to carry the greatest weight.372 Alternatively (or simultaneously),
Fenty may have concluded from accounts such as Nickles’s memo that a
change in policy or personnel was needed.
In either case, Fenty fired Schindler the day before meeting with the
Post editorial board to seek the newspaper’s endorsement.373 Columnist
King quickly praised Schindler’s dismissal in a Post op-ed, concluding:
“I’ve written more than 30 columns critical of DYRS since 2007. Fenty
can’t say he wasn’t warned. Credit him with finally acting.” 374 The same
column referenced Nickles’s memo and explained, “Fenty was confronted
dozen cases and concluding that “systemic” problems “seem to be related to a lack of
supervision, guidance, documentation, and overall management of the DYRS program”); cf.
DEP’T OF YOUTH REHAB. SERVS. (D.C.), UNDATED MEMORANDA ADDRESSING THE REPORT’S
METHODOLOGY AND CORRECTING THE REPORT’S FACTUAL MISSTATEMENTS, available at
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/debonis/dyrs_response.pdf.
369
See, e.g., Cauvin, supra note 364, at B1; Jeffrey Anderson & Matthew Cella, ‘AntiPrison’ at Root of DYRS Problems, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2010),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/nov/21/anti-prison-at-root-of-dyrsproblems/?page=all (quoting Hildum).
370
E.g., Cauvin, supra note 364, at B1.
371
Mike DeBonis, Analysis, After ’06 Landslide, an Apparent Reversal, WASH. POST,
Aug. 30, 2010, at B1. Although public confidence in government performance reached
record highs, a large portion of the District’s residents, especially in the black community,
perceived Fenty as aloof. Id.
372
Id.; see Alan Suderman, Posting Up, WASH. CITY PAPER (Dec. 14, 2011, 6:24 PM),
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/looselips/2011/12/14/posting-up/
(supposing
that the city’s richest, whitest ward “is probably home to the most Post editorial readers”).
373
See Mike DeBonis, DeMorning DeBonis: July 21, 2010, WASH. POST (July 21, 2010,
1:00 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/debonis/2010/07/demorning_debonis_july_21_
2010.html (stating that Fenty met with the editorial board on July 20).
374
Colbert I. King, Op-Ed, D.C.’s Long-Overdue Juvenile Justice Shakeup, WASH. POST,
July 24, 2010, at A13. (“Woefully misinformed are those who claim that Mayor Adrian
Fenty’s removal this week of Marc Schindler as interim director of the Department of Youth
Rehabilitation Services, and the departure of two Schindler deputies, are a setback for
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with overwhelming evidence of serious and recurring DYRS management
problems that threaten public safety. He reacted, as a chief executive
should.”375 Fenty indeed received the Post’s endorsement, but it was not
enough to save the campaign.376
The new mayor, Vincent Gray, chose not to retain Hildum; instead he
nominated Neil Stanley, the DYRS general counsel, to run the agency. 377
So far, Stanley has expressed support for a more careful balance of
rehabilitation and discipline.378 For his part, King has continued to rail
against leniency towards delinquent youths and pilloried Stanley as “Vinny
Schiraldi-lite.”379 In a public hearing, the new chairman of the committee
overseeing DYRS complained that the agency provided a “rest home for
young thugs.”380 Despite testimony in support of Stanley’s nomination
from the Jerry M. plaintiffs’ counsel, the committee recommended
disapproving it and the nomination ultimately was “deemed approved”
without action by the full council.381
From here, the District’s juvenile justice reforms can persist, stall, or
regress. This Part has shown that elected officials and their appointees can
make great changes in this field—in other words, that political actors can
drive reform.382 But political success can be fragile.
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at A13.
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See COUNCIL OF D.C., COMM. ON HUMAN SERVS., REPORT ON P.R. 19-128, at 1–2 (July
8, 2011).
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The Missouri Division of Youth Services has built and maintained the nation’s model
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V. CONCLUSION
This Comment tells the story of a consent decree that could not by
itself fix a broken system. What does it mean for the court and the parties
in a future juvenile corrections lawsuit?
When adjudicating a single delinquency case, the conscientious
juvenile court judge seeks to understand why a youth has offended and how
he can be rehabilitated.383 So it would be natural for the Jerry M. court to
closely oversee compliance with a highly detailed consent decree, as if the
defendant’s rehabilitation is complete when the defendant complies with
each term of the decree. That judicial effort was admirable, but it was not
effective.
Instead of treating the law-breaking government like a delinquent
child, a better approach would treat the law-breaking government as a fully
capable adult who ought to act responsibly. That means a consent decree
should be focused, setting the fewest possible requirements needed to fulfill
the constitutional and statutory rights of the youths in the agency’s care. A
responsible government agency figures out on its own how to do its work.
What would this look like in practice? One contemporary remedial
injunction is a model of simplicity. In Brown v. Plata, after a consent
decree failed to bring about the desired changes, the plaintiffs and the court
required California to meet a population cap to satisfy the inmates’ Eighth
Amendment right to medical care.384 But the parties resisted the temptation
to dictate how the state must satisfy the target.385 The injunction focuses on
a single, clearly defined result and preserves the defendants’ flexibility in
meeting it.
This minimalist approach can be tailored to meet an agency’s most
fundamental problem—even one that is difficult to quantify, such as a lack
of effective leadership. It may simply be exceedingly rare for a chief
executive to choose and stand behind a true reformer in the mold of a Mark
Steward, Jerome Miller, or Vincent Schiraldi.386 A remedial injunction,
then, can assign the plaintiffs an advice-and-consent power over any
prospective nominee to run the agency; that is, it can bind the chief
executive to obtain the plaintiffs’ consent to the selection of an agency head
before the chief executive sends the nomination to the legislature for its
own advice and consent.
383
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Such an injunction would give the plaintiffs a substantial amount of
leverage, installing them as a selection committee over future appointments.
But it need not grant the plaintiffs a removal power; instead, the plaintiffs
would have to live with the person they approved, just as the executive
must. At the same time, the looming presence of the plaintiffs would insure
against an executive’s removal of a capable, reform-minded director.
In one sense, this is a radical proposal. Yet to adhere to a highly
detailed approach that has engendered frustration for decades would be to
expect “an unwarranted triumph of hope over experience.”387
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LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 84, 115 (D.D.C. 2010) (scolding
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